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ABSTRACT
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) will be fielding the SINCGARS
frequency-hopping radio system during the next 5 years. There will be units
within the Corps during the transition period in which both the
conventional fixed-frequency radio and the SINCGARS radio will be
employed in the same area at the same time. The Marine Corps
Communications Architecture Analysis Model (MCCAAM) presented in this
thesis will give Marine Corps decision makers, analysts, and communications
officers the ability to quantify the effectiveness of alternative tactical radio
system configurations within a given Marine Air-Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) environment. Using a unique traffic workload paradigm to
generate realistic message traffic, this object-oriented simulation model
assesses the overall performance of a given architecture with a specified mix
of fixed-frequency and frequency-hopping radios through a penalty accrual
process or through aggregating traditional communications MOEs. USMC
decision makers and communications officers can use the results of the
system performance rankings and associated sensitivity trade-off analysis to
determine where best to allocate the new frequency hopping radios, as they
become available, in order to maximize the overall FM communications
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THESIS DISCLAIMER
The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed in this
research may not have been exercised for all the cases of possible interest.
While every effort has been made, within the time available, to ensure that
the programs are free of computational and logic errors, they cannot be
considered validated. Any application of these programs without additional





The problem of commanding and controlling armed forces, and of
instituting effective communications with and within them, is as old as
war itself. A Stone Age chieftain had to devise the optimal organization
and find the methods and technical means to command the forces at his
disposal. From his day to ours, failure to consider and to solve the
problem was to court disaster—indeed, to make it impossible for the
forces to exist. [Ref. 1]
Success in future conflicts at all levels of intensity will depend on the
ability of Marine commanders to gather, store, display, and forward
information and operational orders at a faster and more efficient level than
ever required before. The strategic significance of communications superiority
lies in its potential to create major asymmetries in the distribution of
information in any given situation [Ref. 2]. Recognizing this, the Marine
Corps is moving toward automation by introducing computer-based systems
and digital communications into virtually every area of command and
control. [Ref. 1]
The recent emphasis on rapidly evolving military technology raises a
major issue for the United States and, specifically, for the Marine Corps. At
what pace should we pursue the new technology, possibly at the expense of
the full completion of current or proposed programs? To answer this and
similar questions in this time of rapidly changing technologies and limited
defense budget, it is more important than ever for the Marine Corps to have
an analytical methodology and complementary modeling technique that can
quickly and thoroughly compare and contrast new or anticipated tactical
command, control and communications (C3) systems [Ref. 3]. To ensure that
only the most cost effective changes are implemented, the Marine Corps
needs the specific capability to:
• compare proposed C3 architectures;
• allocate new resources optimally in existing network structures; and
• appraise the change in performance that will result from
implementing specific improvements in equipment, doctrine or
training [Ref. 4].
As part of a needed modernization of its communication technology, the
Marine Corps will be fielding the SINCGARS frequency-hopping radio system
as a replacement for the VRC-12 family of single channel radios during the
next five to ten years. Over the transition period, there will be units in
which the current, conventional, fixed-frequency radios and the SINCGARS
radios will be employed in the same geographical place at the same time.
Knowing that there will not be enough money in the budget to totally replace
all the older radios at one time, and given an imperfectly specified enemy
jamming, interference, and interception capability, one of the Marine Corps'
current challenges is the allocation of the new SINCGARS radios within the
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) structure to provide the most
reliable, robust, and effective architectures possible.
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to design and implement a simulation
model to provide Marine Corps decision makers, analysts, and
communications officers the ability to quantify the effectiveness of alternative
tactical radio system configurations within any specific MAGTF
environment. The Marine Corps Communication Architecture Analysis
Model (MCCAAM) presented in this thesis uses a unique traffic workload
paradigm to generate realistic network traffic and assesses the overall
performance of a given architecture (a specified mix of fixed-frequency and
frequency-hopping radios) through a penalty accrual process or through
aggregating traditional communications MOEs. This object-oriented
simulation model will allow Marine Corps decision makers to determine the
best allocation of the new frequency hopping radios, as they become available,
in order to maximize the overall communications performance of a MAGTF.
As an example of how MCCAAM can be used, this thesis presents a
statistical analysis of four different SINCGARS allocation schemes that might
be considered by the Marine Corps. The objective of this analytical example is
to determine whether there is any real difference in the tactical radio system
performance between the different allocation schemes, to estimate those
differences using two different performance measuring approaches, and to
assess the precision of the estimates.
C OUTLINE OF THESIS CHAPTERS
Given the thesis background and purpose described above, the first step
pursued in this thesis is to completely describe and frame the problem under
consideration. Chapter II gives the necessary background information to
bound the Marine Corps' communication architecture analysis problem. We
illustrate the complexity and scope of the problem by briefly describing the
unique communication needs presented by the expeditionary nature of the
various MAGTF levels of organization. The many factors that contribute to
the complexity of any communications analysis are highlighted by discussing
general Marine Corps communication principles, equipment, and
information requirements. This information is important because it drives
much of the modelling that is implemented. To provide the necessary
background for the measures of effectiveness used in this analysis, the key
characteristics of the VRC-12 family of radios currently in use and the new
frequency-hopping radios is presented. Basically a facts and figures section,
Chapter II concludes with a description of the analysis process that was used
in approaching this problem.
Chapter III explains why simulation was used for this analysis and
describes the key features of object-oriented simulation and how they made
this approach the best analysis tool for our problem. A brief argument is
given in support of the decision to use the MODSIM II language instead of a
graphically oriented product. Following the essential aspects of the modelling
language, the modular approach we used in writing code is described, and the
model development phases are described (because they were a key part of the
whole problem solving process). To provide a general understanding of the
actual model used for this analysis, the essential message traffic paradigm is
presented and the key module contents are highlighted. The way the many
different modules interact during an actual simulation run is presented next
as a typical scenario "flow." The chapter concludes with a discussion of the
model data requirements and how they were met. A reasonable defense of
most assumptions is presented to fully define those areas that are not fully
addressed or modeled. Model resolution is re-addressed. Chapter III is
essential because it highlights the areas of the model development,
implementation, and analysis that are not readily apparent.
Chapter IV starts the transition from the model to the analysis through a
full discussion of measures of performance, measures of effectiveness, and
measures of force effectiveness. By highlighting the characteristics of the
desired MOEs, a case is made for those specific MOEs used in the analysis.
The MOE aggregation approach we adopted is discussed with advantages and
disadvantages presented. The penalty process used to assess the overall
performance of a given network is described and the accompanying output
analysis is briefly highlighted.
Chapter V specifically ties the chosen MOEs to the actual simulation runs
through the experimental design that was established to capture and measure
system differences for our example. Also in this chapter, the alternate
SINCGARS allocation schemes are described and we present the way the
simulation model was used to compare them.
Chapter VI begins by illustrating how the model output was used to
verify the model. After model verification is established, the experimental
results are detailed and a claim is made that the effectiveness of the
alternative communications systems has been sufficiently quantified. The
alternative communication system performance results are presented in a
manner that allows a decision maker to readily see the origins and
significance of the differences. Before Chapter VI closes with a three step
approach to model validation, we discuss the use of variance reduction
techniques.
Finally, Chapter VII recaptures the highlights of our model development
work and its applicability to the current Marine Corps communications
analysis problems. Concluding comments regarding model validation and
usefulness are followed by a discussion of potential model embellishments.
II. PROBLEM APPROACH AND FRAMEWORK
A. THE ANALYSIS PROCESS
The previous chapter presented the problem background and the focus of
this thesis. The current section describes the analysis process used in
approaching our problem. We accomplish this by focusing on the different
steps undertaken throughout MCCAAM model development and
application.
In any analysis supporting decisions during the life cycle of a system, it is
essential to be able to relate the contribution of the various alternatives
under consideration to the desired objectives of the system, or military
force. The mechanism by which this relationship is established is
referred to as "the analysis process." [Ref. 5]
Proper selection of the criteria to be used in comparing alternatives is
more an art than a science and is treated as one of the most important steps in
developing an analysis plan. Our ability to specify the values of these criteria
heavily influences the efficacy of the analysis to accomplish the objectives
defined during problem formulation.
The Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure (MCES)
developed by a joint working group [Ref. 5] is a general approach for
evaluating C3 systems that has been successfully applied to a number of issues
concerning C3 systems planning, acquisition, testing and operation. It
incorporates all of the previously mentioned basic analysis activities in a
series of seven steps or modules (Figure 1) to evaluate alternative C3 systems
and architectures. The following paragraphs describe how these modules

























Figure 1. Modular Communications Evaluation Structure (MCES)
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PROBLEM FORMULATION MODULE. In this module, the Marine Corps
decision makers were identified and their objectives were described. Next,
the alternatives for the SINCGARS allocation problem were identified so they
could be modelled in later steps, and the various mission areas affected were
detailed. As a result, the scope and depth of the Marine Corps analysis needs
were defined and basic assumptions were agreed upon.
SYSTEM BOUNDING MODULE. Here the MAGTF elements that would
be affected by the SINCGARS allocations were identified from doctrinal
publications. C3 system statics (units & radios) were distinguished from
system dynamics (activities & procedures), and physical units were defined
along with their associated command structures. Marine Corps standard
operating principles were investigated to provide needed guidance for proper
modelling of message durations, protocols, and reporting requirements.
PROCESS DEFINITION MODULE. In this phase, the dynamic C3
processes of the Marine Corps tactical FM radio networks were identified by
looking at the functions of the C3 cycle (sense, assess, generate, select, plan,
and direct) as performed by the units identified in the previous phase. Since
the SINCGARS system is most concerned with the conveyance of sensed
information, plans, and direction, the model developed is actually a
communications model more than an overall C3 system model. The
assessment, generation, and selection functions are not really addressed in
MCCAAM.
INTEGRATION MODULE. In this module, basic communications
functions (enter net, transmit, receive, change frequency, etc.) were mapped to
the command system elements (specific units or command and control
facilities). In this modeling context, the message traffic flow represents most
of this mapping. This integration is the combination of the results of steps
two and three: integrating the system elements and the process functions
into a valid simulation model.
SPECIFICATION OF MEASURES MODULE. At this stage, Measures of
Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of Performance (MOPs) were identified
and agreed upon with the Marine Corps project officers. The MOEs selected
measure aspects of the communication system functions that contribute to
the overall accomplishment of critical missions while the MOPs quantify
critical capabilities of the radios.
DATA GENERATION MODULE. Here values for the MOPs and MOEs
were obtained from the simulation model (MCCAAM). This is accomplished
by generating traffic with different rates of occurrences. This traffic is
simulated as it works through the given force architecture where relevent
net and radio statistics are collected. Many simulation test runs under a
specific experimental design yield the data ultimately used in our analysis.
AGGREGATION AND INTERPRETATION MODULE. The numerical
results obtained from the simulation runs as MOPs and MOEs were
aggregated under a scheme described in Chapter in to provide an overall
quantifiable measure of system effectiveness.
In the SINCGARS allocation application, the measures would ideally be
measures of force effectiveness (MOFEs) that reflected the effect better
communications had on the outcome of battles. But the Marine Corps
desired a flexible, scenario-independent model which, of necessity, excludes
battle outcomes. Therefore, measures of communications effectiveness were
10
selected in two major categories: timeliness of message receipt and reliability
of network connectivity.
B. USMC MAGTF STRUCTURE
To understand the specific areas of our simulation model development it
is necessary to understand the building blocks that were used to model the
MAGTF communications architecture. These building blocks are the MAGTF
force structure and how units are related organizationally, the
communications principles dictating how, when, and why units
communicate, and the physical equipment that is used to actually establish
the essential communication lines. Figure 2 [Ref. 5] illustrates how these
building blocks exist within a framework that contains not only the
equipment sub-systems, but the forces and environment as well.
^?'^ '
.
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Figure 2. Communication System Bounding
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This section briefly discusses these building blocks as motivation for how
and why our model was developed the way it was.
A Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is the organizational
structure used for nearly all operations conducted by United States Marine
Corps forces. Independent of the size of the force, MAGTFs are combined
arms organizations composed of a command element, a ground combat
element, an aviation combat element, and a combat service support element
(See Figures 3 & 4).
Command
Element








Figure 3. MAGTF Element Sizes
In order to support combined air, ground and logistics operations, four (or
more) distinct command and control systems which differ in degree of
centralization, automation, mobility, and complexity must be integrated.
These distinct systems are composed of heterogeneous links and widely
shared network resources which, when combined, form the key neurological
component of a MAGTF. [Ref. 11]
The three sizes of operational MAGTF's are the Marine Expeditionary
Unit, Marine Expeditionary Brigade, and Marine Expeditionary Force (MEU,
12
MEB, MEF). From the smaller, more mobile MEU to the massive MEF, these
MAGTFs are formed for specific operational requirements from various
available units as illustrated in Figure 4.
ACE GCE CSSE
MEU Squadron Battalion CSSD
MEB Group Regiment BSSG
MEF Wing Division FSSG
Figure 4. MAGTF Element Sizes
The purpose of system bounding (third step in the MCES process) is to
explicitly define the organizational scope of the problem. The result of this
problem scoping step are lists or tables of the physical elements and structures
that enumerate the levels of the problems. The complete list of all units
involved in this specific MEB analysis is provided in Appendix D.
The system of focus is the MEB C3. The conceptual name for this system
is the Marine Corps Tactical Command and Control System (MTACCS). It
consists of the people, the hardware, and the software systems in the
operational headquarters or command and control facilities (C2FACs) of the
MEB. There are subsystems of the MTACCS for ground C3, aviation C3,
combat service support (CSS) C3, and intelligence. Table 1 shows some of the
major systems under each of these. Some of these are currently under
development while others are in place. The communications elements of
these systems are represented in the Marine Corps Tactical Communications
Architecture overview chart which cannot be reproduced at this scale but
13
which would be familiar to anyone involved in Marine Corps C3 discussions.
[Ref. 18]
TABLE 1. EXAMPLE MTACCS SYSTEMS
Ground C2 System
Tactical Combat Operations (TCO)
Fireflex System
Aviation C2 System
Advanced Tactical Air Command and Control Central (ATACC)
Tactical Air Operations Module (TAOM)
Combat Service Support System
Marine Integrated Personnel System (MIPS)
Logistics Automated Information System (LOGISTATS)
Intelligence System
Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Process and Evaluation System
(TERPES)
MCCAAM is currently being used to analyze only the ground C3 systems,
but by design it can easily be modified and enlarged to incorporate aviation
and combat service support systems that are key parts of a complete MEB
communications architecture. Figure 5 [Ref. 17] provides another view of
MCCAAM's current scope—the tactical, voice radio systems.
C MAGTF COMMUNICATIONS
1. General
A command and control system is defined [Ref. 6] as consisting of the
facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to
a commander for planning, directing, coordinating and controlling
operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned. The

















































































Figure 5. MAGTF Communications Systems
• Provide the commander accurate and timely information and ideas for
developing courses of action and making decisions.
• Translate the commander's decisions into plans and orders.
• Communicate those plans and orders to subordinates.
• Provide required information to and respond to tasking from higher
and supported commands.
To build a simulation model of a MAGTF tactical communications
network in all of its dynamics, it was first necessary to understand all the
mathematical model underpinnings that would be used to structure the
simulation process. First, a brief discussion of the communications process is
15
presented. This process must be understood to effectively model any
communications architecture.
Each unit within a MAGTF possesses specified radio resources which
individually compete for transmission time over their assigned nets. Over
time, each radio receives messages which are classified according to priority,
and higher priority traffic usually gets transmission precedence. When the
respective radio operators receive written messages to be transmitted to
higher, subordinate and adjacent units, they wait until the tactical net is free
of traffic and then attempt to reach the receiving units with their highest
priority message. If a radio operator receives messages of the same priority,
he usually transmits them in the order he receives them. This discipline is
commonly referred to as store-and-forward switching. [Ref. 32]
Delay of the messages may, in practical military networks, vary from
a fraction of a second to several hours, measured from the time the message
is first received by the initial radio operator. This delay consists of the times
for the unit operators to store and retrieve the message along the various
links, the times that the message sits in storage queues at the unit nodes
waiting for the net to become available, and the often extensive time required
to just make radio contact with the intended receiver. The first types of delays
(node processing and net transmission) can be made relatively small in digital
communications relative to the maximum tolerable delay. In voice
communications, the net transmission time is often much larger. The unit-
to-unit message delay, which is typically the principal criterion of
performance, depends largely on the queuing delays at the various units.
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Modelling all forms of these delays is a central focus of our programming
effort. [Ref.32]
Given the communications problem stated above, it was natural to
approach our modelling task from the queueing theory perspective where a
large number of alternative mathematical models have been produced for
various waiting line situations. We initially focused on the single unit
queuing system and then branched out to model the entire communication
architecture as a network of queues.
The operating characteristics of queuing systems are determined by
two key distributions: the probability distributions of the inter-arrival times
and of the service times. To build a simulation model as a representation of
the real tactical communication system we were interested in, it was first
necessary to specify the assumed form of these two key distributions. To be
useful in any form, the assumed distributions had to be sufficiently realistic
so that the model provides reasonable predictions, while at the same time
being feasible to work with. A discussion of the distributions used to provide
randomization in MCCAAM is provided in section C of Chapter HI.
2. Communications Principles
This section addresses MAGTF command, control and
communication principles applicable to operation of communications and
computers in task forces at all levels of warfare. This material is presented to
motivate and explain the Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) selected and to
illustrate the type of information that was considered during the modelling
process. To build a communications architecture which will serve the needs
of a wide variety of users and communications managers, it is essential that
17
the complex communications possible with today's technology be guided by
fundamental doctrine. Nearly all of the principles which follow have been
drawn verbatim from doctrinal publications and are categorized into two
categories: those applicable to organizations and those inherent in the
communications process. [Ref.8]
Principles applicable to organizations [Ref. 7: par 1008] are essentially
rules of the road. They state which commander has the responsibility for
establishing and maintaining communications when units work together.
Since these are conventions established to place responsibility, no elaboration
is necessary.
• Communications between a senior and subordinate unit are the
responsibility of the senior commander.
• Communications between adjacent units are the responsibility of the
first common senior commander.
• Communications between a supporting and supported unit are the
responsibility of the supporting unit commander.
• Communications between a unit and an attached unit are the
responsibility of the unit to which the attachment is made.
Principles applicable to the communications process that were
considered in modeling the MAGTF C3 architecture and which are important
to MOE selection are the following [Ref. 7: par 1004, 1005]:
• Communications must be reliable. Communications which enable a
commander to plan, direct, coordinate and control forces in combat
must be fully dependable and accurate. Reliability is attained through
dependable equipment, excellent planning and execution techniques,
and first class communications training of all personnel.
• Communications must be secure from all except intended recipients.
All unauthorized persons and organizations must be denied
information about a command's activity and status. This results in an
enhanced operational security (OPSEC) posture and, at the same time,
denies the enemy information. Security includes safeguarding the
18
physical equipment, documents, and personnel as well as the
cryptographic, transmission, and emission security.
• Communications must be timely. Command and control
communications must arrive at the intended user's location in time to
be made useful. Speed of communications refers not only to the ability
of hardware to transmit and receive data, but to the use of efficient
methods and procedures.
• Communications must be flexible. FMFM 3-30 states that "Flexibility is
the ability to support wide dispersion of units under adverse and
varying conditions. A flexible communications system is achieved by
detailed advanced planning, anticipation of the commander's needs,
and provisions for the installation and maintenance of a responsive
communications system."
• Communications must be interoperable. For communications systems
to transfer data successfully, it is obviously essential that message
standards, protocol standards, and data standards be established and
adhered to.
• Communications systems must be mobile. Combat operations,
especially Marine Corps offensive combat, requires rapid maneuver of
forces. A communications system must be capable of full support of
force maneuver. The amount of time involved in the set-up and
establishment of a network is an important factor of this criteria.
• Communications systems must be survivable. Vital to the maneuver
of forces, communications must be invulnerable to interruption on
any battlefield and at any level of warfare. Inherent in this criteria is
the need for a communications system to be able to operate in the
midst of jamming, interference, direction finding and other enemy
electronic activities.
• Communications must be economical.
• Communications must be simple. Simplicity promotes smooth,
efficient operation for users and communications personnel who must
establish, maintain and use systems. Even though the technical aspects
of communications systems become complex, it is essential to keep
procedures and techniques as simple as possible in order to meet the
objectives of the command and control system.
3. Characteristics of FM Voice Transmission
Within the infantry, artillery, and mechanized units of a Marine
Corps MAGTF, the primary method of communications between elements is
19
typically single-channel, frequency modulated (FM) radios utilizing voice
transmission. While this mode is easy to use, reliable, and fast, it does suffer
from certain limitations. U.S. Marine Corps tactical FM radios generally
operate in the frequency range of 30 to 76 megahertz (MHz) with typical
output powers ranging from 3-5 watts in portable man-packed radios to 33
watts for the vehicular radios. Since radio waves above 30 MHz primarily
travel by line-of-sight paths and since power outputs of 3 to 33 watts are not
high, these radios are generally reliable only for short distance transmissions.
Also, single channel tactical FM radio equipment is characteristically half
duplex. That is, all tactical radios are push-to-talk and release-to-listen radios.
They can only transmit or receive, but not both at the same time. When only
one station transmits a message on a given frequency at a time, assuming that
no jammers are active and an acceptable propagation path exists, then any
station within range of that transmitter will receive its transmissions. If,
however, two or more stations attempt to transmit simultaneously on the
same frequency, interference may occur and the receiving stations may not be
able to discern the intended signals. Furthermore, FM radios tend to capture
the strongest signal transmitted on their respective listening frequencies.
This characteristic, known as FM capture, tends to make single channel radios
very susceptible to jamming. [Ref. 10]
Based on the limitations and characteristics of FM radios discussed
above, the following simplifying assumptions were made for this model and
analysis:
• Transmissions under way in a net will not be interrupted by other
stations in the net desiring to use the net.
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• When a message is transmitted over a net, all stations that receive the
message will interpret that message correctly. This assumption is that
human error in interpretation is negligible.
The human factors being assumed away are not trivial but are so
complex that attempts to simulate them would detract from the overall
modelling effort. Proper training and motivation of radio operators will
eliminate much of the human factor problems [Ref. 9:pp. 17-18].
4. The Commander's Critical Information Requirements
To further motivate the structure and background of our
communications model, this section highlights the necessity for a dependable
C3 architecture that processes traffic in a timely manner. We then present an
overview of how current technology is being used to achieve these goals in
military communications. It is our intent that the MCCAAM model will be
expanded to test and predict the impact of some of these current changes.
Fundamental to any discussion of command, control, and
communications is the commodity of information. Since time is always
working against the commander's ability to analyze information for the
purpose of decision making, the keystone of any successful command and
control system is an efficient communications backbone . "On today's
battlefield, the ability of a commander to pass information among his forces is
critical to the outcome of any engagement [Ref. 7]." Given this truth, our
model structures and measures of effectiveness are highly time sensitive.
In amphibious operations, the single channel radios (SCRs) are the
principal means of communication during the assault phase. SCR
configurations supporting high frequency (HF), very high frequency (VHF),
and ultra high frequency (UHF) communications are found throughout all
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elements of a MAGTF. Though these radios have been designed and
traditionally used for voice communications, computer technological
advancements have introduced the capability to transmit computer-generated
information, such as a situation report typed on a word processor, over
tactical radio systems.
A significant advantage of computer-to-computer communications
instead of voice is the speed of information that is transferred and the fact
that operator intervention is kept to a minimum. For example, in the time it
takes one to read this paragraph, an entire Size, Activity, Location, Unit,
Time, Equipment (SALUTE) report of over 300 words can be transmitted.
This ability to transmit high volumes of information in a short time is called
burst transmission, and time on the air is significantly reduced with this
capability. Consequently, the opportunity for the enemy to successfully locate
a position is minimized. [Ref. 1]
As the Marine Corps and other services continue to incorporate
technological advances like digital communications terminals (DCTs) and
packet radio modems in their communications architectures, it will be
essential that the services have the means to assess their contribution to the
overall communication system performance. Though not currently
modelling these aspects of modern military communication, MCCAAM can
be easily modified to test the effects of such technology on a given
architecture's message throughput, efficiency, and resistance to intervention.
C SINCGARS/VRC-12 CHARACTERISTICS
This section provides the reader with a general description of the physical
characteristics and functional parameters of the current AN/VRC-12 and
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AN/PRC-77 radios compared to the SINCGARS-V replacement
configurations. The differences between the two radio technologies affect the
overall FM communication system performance, and thus serve as the
foundation for the subjective MOE assessments presented in Chapter IV.[Ref.
10]
1. Conventional Fixed-Frequency Radios
a. General
The AN/VRC-12 series radio and AN/PRC-77 family radio are
the primary radios in current use by the U.S. Marine Corps for the VHF-FM
tactical communications. Throughout the remainder of this thesis, the phrase
"conventional, fixed-frequency radio" will pertain to these two types of radios
currently employed by the Marine Corps.
b. Capabilities
The radio sets in the AN/VRC-12 family are short-range,
vehicular radio sets. The AN/PRC-77 is a compatible, short range, man-
packed radio. These radios provide FM voice and telephone (MUX)
communications and can be used with secure voice and digital data
equipment. Two of the sets (VRC-45 and VRC-49) have re-transmission
capability. The radio sets of the AN/VRC-12 family are used in nets with the
AN/PRC-77 radio sets within the 30.00 to 75.95 MHz frequency range. The
conventional radios are capable of transmitting and receiving on one of 920
frequency channels separated by 50 KHz, and have a planning range of 8 to 41
kilometers. Range depends on power out, antenna type and height and
terrain/atmosphere conditions.
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c. Establishing a Fixed-Frequency Net
The radio links established between designated radio stations can
be categorized as a broadcast communication network. Each radio station is
attached to a transmitter/receiver that communicates over a medium shared
by other stations. All radio stations that are tuned to the same channel and
that are within transmission range of each other will be able to receive a
broadcast from a transmitting station. Two observations are in order for
broadcast communications networks:
• Since the transmission medium is shared, only a single station can
successfully transmit at a time. This requires some mechanism for
controlling access to the shared channel. The net control station (NCS)
offers a centralized scheme of control. The NCS can direct that a "free
net" be established which is also known as the ALOHA access control
technique. The ALOHA method is a first come, first served process.
• Establishment of radio links is limited by the nature of the broadcast
medium. The weather, terrain, and link distance affect the signal
transmission loss between stations in the broadcast communications
network.
To establish a radio net with the conventional, fixed-frequency radios, the
operator of a radio set must first locate his designated frequency in a
Communications-Electronics Operation Instruction (CEOI). The frequency
changes once every 12 hours. The operator then, using the lowest power
setting available (to prevent unwanted transmission range/exposure to
enemy listening or DF devices), makes radio voice contact with the net
control station (NCS), asks permission to enter the net, authenticates, and
waits for instructions from the NCS. The NCS, when given a correct
authentication, grants the operator permission to enter the net, and informs
the operator of net procedures (if any special ones exist). The NCS can either
establish a directed net where the radio operator must make all
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communication links through the NCS, or a free net can be established where
any station in the net can call any other station in the net without going
through the NCS. [Ref. 10]
2. SINCGARS-V Frequency-Hopping Radio
a. General
SINCGARS-V is scheduled to replace some of the USMC
configurations of the AN/PRC-77 and AN/VRC-12 family radios over the
next five years. Limited by a budget that is traditionally very "tight," the
Marine Corps does not have the luxury of replacing all the older radios at one
time, though that is understood to be the eventual goal. With obvious
emphasis on providing for the combat arms first, the infantry, armor, and
artillery units will receive the first SINCGARS radios. See page 21 of [10] for
the nomenclatures of the SINCGARS-V radio configurations which are
scheduled to replace the conventional, fixed-frequency radios. This new radio
will serve as the main tactical voice radio for the MAGTF when fully
allocated, and therefore will be critical to successful operations ashore. As
mentioned previously, since there will not be a total one-time replacement
of the older radios, there will be many situations over the next few years
when conventional radios and SINCGARS will be operating in the same area.
Though not discussed in this thesis, this will undoubtedly provide many
interoperability, maintenance, and supply challenges.
b. Capabilities
SINCGARS is a VHF-FM radio system, electronically tuned and
controlled, which operates in the 30 to 88 MHz frequency band. It is able to
transmit analog voice, tactical analog data, and 16 kilobit-per-second digital
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data record traffic. The transmission range for SINCGARS is similar to that
of the AN/VRC-12 family radios. This new system provides approximately
2320 discrete channels in the VHF spectrum compared to the 920 provided by
the current radios. It can be configured in man-pack, vehicular, and airborne
versions and it features operational upgrades through various means to
include:
• Push button tuning via keyboard
• Single Channel to frequency hopping by single switch operation
• Automatic identification of voice or data
• LED display provides comprehensive status information
The SINCGARS is lighter and about half the size of its current
counterparts (See Figure 6 for a summary of technical characteristics). Some
models of SINCGARS have a re-transmission capability similar to that of the
present system that uses two receiver-transmitters in a special configuration
to transmit to units out of normal communications range.
The primary ECCM (Electronic Counter-Counter Measures)
technique for SINCGARS is its ability to frequency hop. An ECCM device can
be fixed to the radio to give it six ECCM channels in addition to two fixed-
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SYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS:
Frequency Range 30.00 to 87.975 MHz
Modulation type Frequency modulation (binary or analog) 10 Hz to 8.0 kHz
Channels 2320
Channel spacing 25 kHz
Modes of operation Single channel and frequency hopping
Preset channels 6 for single channel operation
Frequency Hopping Preset Radio Nets 6 each from front panel selector switch
Frequency Offset Capability ± 5 and ± 10 kHz to any manual or preset frequency
Frequency Entry Through the keyboard
Frequency Stability ± 5.0 PPM
Communications Security Capability Will operate with current US inventory COMSEC equipment
Digital Capability 16 kbps and FSK (with optional data rate adapter)
Self Test Microprocessor controlled in conjunction with LCD display
Radio tuning All electronic
ECEIVER CHARACTERISTICS:
Noise Figure 10 dB
Image Rejection 80 dB minimum
IF Rejection ' 100 dB minimum
Audio output 50 mW or 1 mW/150 ohms (selectable)
TRANSMITTER CHARACTERISTICS:
Power output 10 watts nominal
Harmonic suppression MIL-STD-461A
Transmitter spurious responses 100 dB
Frequency deviation ± 6.5 kHz
'NPUT POWER:
Primary Power +28 Vdc per MIL-STD-704 (3.5 Amps Max.)
Lighting 0-115 Vac 400 Hz (Electroluminescent)
ENVIRONMENTAL:
Specification MIL-E-5400 Class IA
:MTERFACE CHARACTERISTICS:
Interfaces with the following Avionics equipment:
• CV-3885/ARC-201 Data Rate Adapter
• KY-58. Z-AHQ. Z-AHP COMSEC Equipment
• ID-1351A Homing Meter
• C-1611, C-6533, C-10414 Intercoms
• AM-7189A/ARC 50-Watt Power Amplifier
Figure 6. SINCGARS Technical Characteristics
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frequency channels. The system uses a number of separate frequencies, and
one channel is established by synchronizing the transmission and reception
of these frequencies. The frequencies to which the signal can be hopped can
follow an ordered or random sequence called a hop set.
The band-width is increased due to the use of a multiple number
of frequencies per channel. More users can operate within the same band
employing this technique since they are only on one specific frequency for a
very short period of time. Though there have been several proposals for
different algorithms to deal with this problem, assignment of these
frequencies remains a difficult challenge. [Ref. 10]
The SINCGARS radio system is interoperable with the current
inventory of radios in both the plain text and cipher modes on a single fixed
channel. Communications security (COMSEC) equipment will be internal or
external to the radio system and both are compatible with the current
radio/COMSEC configurations.
Some additional features of the SINCGARS radio are [Ref. 10] :
Balanced nuclear hardening to include Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)
and Transient Radiation Effects on Electronics (TREE) protection.
Modular components which provide commonality among all
configurations.
A high power amplifier (HPA) module used with the SINCGARS to
provide a power output of 50 watts.
Any one of six frequency pre-sets may be switch-selected by the
operator.
Built-in-test (BIT) unit to detect failures in equipment modules or
cards.
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c. Establishing a Frequency-Hopping Net
Similar to the current radio system, a broadcast communication
network will be used to establish the frequency-hopping SINCGARS radio
nets. However, the procedures for establishing the SINCGARS radio nets is a
much more complicated process, as described below.
The technical characteristics of the frequency-hopping radio
requires multi-frequency management on a decentralized basis. As a result,
the procedures required to establish a radio net become much more
complicated. The NCS must distribute five variables required for frequency-






Mission Day/Time of Day
A battlefield electronic CEOI system (BECS) electronic notebook is used to
generate, store, display, or transfer the five variables required for SINCGARS
frequency-hopping net operation to the radio sets. [Ref. 10]
There are two methods for loading the data into the radio sets.
The NCS can use either a local fill procedure or an electronic remote fill
(ERF). A local fill procedure is accomplished by physically connecting an
ECCM fill device or a tape to the radio while electronic remote fill is
performed by electronically transmitting frequency hopset variables between
SINCGARS radios. (Since much of the data needed by SINCGARS is based on
the time of day variable mentioned above, any inconsistency in the filling
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procedure can lead to a rather time consuming set-up time for a tactical
SINCGARS net).
In summary, the existing VRC-12 radios are not as flexible and
reliable as the new SINCGARS radios, but they are simpler to set up and use.
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in. SOLUTION METHODOLOGY
Working from our problem framework outlined in the previous chapter,
Chapter III explains how the MAGTF structure, communications principles,
and equipment were incorporated into our model development. We begin by
giving our rationale for choosing simulation as the appropriate modeling
tool, and then briefly discuss our choice of a simulation language. The key
sub-models of MCCAAM are then presented as a preliminary to describing
the overall simulation flow. We detail how messages are handled within the
simulated communications architecture to show the reader the key logic that
allows for accurate analysis of alternative architectures. This chapter
concludes with a description of the model's data input requirements and
assumptions.
A. WHY SIMULATION?
A subjective allocation of SINCGARS radios could be made by asking
experienced officers to review existing architectures and traffic requirements
and then allocate the available SINCGARS radios to the VHF networks that
need them most (highest traffic and most vulnerability). However, even
experienced officers would have difficulty comparing the operational
tradeoffs offered by different allocations and determining how the various
nets would actually perform in different environments. Therefore, a
quantitative model, such as discussed in this Chapter, is desirable. [Ref. 18]
Over time, much effort has been expended evaluating the performance of
military organizations' communication systems. Typically, these efforts have
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involved modelling the workload the communications system must handle.
The performance is evaluated using analytic, approximation, Monte Carlo, or
system simulation methods. To a large degree, the following aspects of a
model are dictated by the degree to which the workload model reflects reality
[Ref. 11]:
• the choice of evaluation technology,
• the development and implementation costs, and
• the degree of acceptance and usability of the end product.
One of the main strengths of the analytical approach is that it abstracts the
essence of the problem and reveals its underlying structure, which provides
insight into the cause-and-effect relationships within the system. These
methods attempt to find and solve mathematical equations in a closed form
solution to accurately describe the behavior of a system under different
circumstances. If it is possible to construct an analytical model that is both a
reasonable idealization of the problem and amenable to solution, this
approach is usually superior to simulation. However, many problems are so
complex that they cannot be solved analytically. This is because these systems
(including C3 systems) are composed of a variety of subsystems that, even
when viewed individually, are extremely difficult to analyze by conventional
methods. Additionally, the choice of MOEs often drives us to use simulation,
independent of the system's complexity.
If a conventional approach is pursued to keep the problem within a
tractable domain, assumptions must be made that could distort the physical
reality of the system. Simulation is a versatile tool that is typically used when
the system involved is too complex to be analyzed satisfactorily by analytical
models. [Ref. 12]
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With this in mind, we view simulation as a controlled statistical
sampling technique for estimating the performance of a complex stochastic
communications system. We simulate the actions of the communications
system over time and record its aggregate behavior to estimate performance.
We understand and want to make clear that "simulation is inherently an
imprecise technique that provides only statistical estimates rather than exact
results. It compares alternatives rather than generating an optimal one." [Ref.
13:pp. 857 & 887]
After choosing simulation as our modelling technique, we examined the
full range of the simulation fidelity spectrum. A brief discussion of models
found at the extremes of this fidelity spectrum will help clarify the strengths
of our approach.
At one end of the simulation fidelity spectrum, there exist models which
have stationary arrival processes of message-sending requirements. These
processes are typically stationary Poisson. This simple workload model is
used because evaluating the resulting communications traffic process is
sometimes analytically tractable. This approach usually allows for relatively
inexpensive development at the expense of reality, usability, and user
acceptance. Examples of this approach can be found in [Ref. 14].
At the other extreme are models which attempt to simulate the evolution
of combat, thereby inducing a realistic communications workload. Some of
the drawbacks of this approach are readily apparent. In order to generate the
communications traffic, the combat simulation must be of high resolution.
Thus, reality comes with significant model development costs, and
programming costs. Such models require voluminous input data, to which
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confidence in model output is very tightly linked. Conclusions drawn from
the results of high resolution combat models are valid only for the specific
scenario used. [Ref. 11] Furthermore, inclusion of details costs computational
effort with each replication of the (obviously terminating) scenario, resulting
in extremely large computing requirements for meager accuracy. These types
of models display hard-to-quantify effectiveness, as the engagement modeled
can take several distinct turns during its evolution. Most frustrating, it
becomes very difficult to attribute changes in performance to variations in
input. Examples of high resolution combat models for communications
performance analysis can also be found in [Ref. 14].
In this thesis, we describe a model of MAGTF communications traffic
which occupies the middle ground of the simulation fidelity spectrum
between the extremes of simple, analytically tractable Poisson models and
high resolution combat models. Our model uses a paradigm of Marine Broad
Operational Tasks (MBOTs), Broad Operational Subtasks (BOSTs), and
Message Exchange Occurrences (MEOs) to avoid the weak points of the
simulation extremes described above. This paradigm is described in section
C.l of this chapter.
In summary, it is clear that a simulation model is the appropriate tool for
analyzing the complex military communications process. It provides a means
to experiment with proposed systems or architectures without actually
implementing them. With proper experimental design and sound statistical
analysis, the results of a simulation can, and often do, provide decision
makers with a very effective decision-making aid.
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B. OBJECT ORIENTED PROGRAMMING
Object-oriented programming is a design and programming discipline
that focuses on the objects that make up the system rather than on the overall
function of the system. While this is at odds with traditional top-down
design techniques, we will see that there are excellent reasons for adopting
this point of view. [Ref. 22]
This introductory section is presented since object-oriented programming
is fairly new to the military and the selection of a modelling language is a key
part of any computer modelling problem. It highlights object-oriented
programming^ many strengths and the reasons for choosing MODSIM II as
our simulation language. [See reference 15 for details of the MODSIM
programming language]
1. MODSIM n
The result of evolutionary language developments, the Modular
Simulation language, MODSIM II, is a general-purpose, modular, block
structured language which provides support for object-oriented programming
and discrete event simulation. It has several advantages over non-object-
oriented simulation languages when used in modelling complex, interactive
sytems like military communications architectures. [Ref. 15]
• Modularity: Programs may be (but are not required to be) divided into
modules. Each module is stored in a separate file. The advantages of
this approach are that these modules can be compiled separately,
saving time when only one of them is edited. Modules can import
constructs and definitions from each other. This modularity allows
one to easily model real-world sub-systems as separate parts of a large
model and lends itself to multiple programmers.
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Block-Structured: A block is made up of declarations and executable
statements. It may contain smaller blocks. The important feature of
block-structured languages is that the scope or visibility of variables is
restricted to the block in which they are declared and any subsidiary
blocks. This feature helps to make programs very reliable and easily
modifiable.
Object-Oriented : An object is an encapsulation of a data record (obejct's
fields) which describes the state of the object and procedures called
methods which describe its behaviors. (See Fig. 7) Objects are more
concrete than most programming constructs in that they exist as
individual entities throughout a program execution. They interact
through a clearly defined protocol, and the fields of an object instance












radio ARRAY INTEGER OF RadioObj;
netType ARRAY INTEGER OF NetDesignationType;
ASK METHOD Objlnit;
TELL METHOD ReceiveBostlnstance (INIncomingBostPack: BostlnstanceTxObj;
IN IntendedReceiver : INTEGER;
IN SelectedRadio : RadioObj;
IN ReceiptStatus : ReceiptStarusType);
TELL METHOD ExceptionHandlingRoute
(IN IncomingBostPack : BostlnstanceTxObj);
TELL METHOD KnowAboutJamming (IN Radio : RadioObj;
IN Index : INTEGER);
Figure 7. Example of MODSIM Object with its Fields and Methods
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There are other key object-oriented constructs of MODSIM II that make it
such a powerful and flexible tool. These other constructs are detailed in [15]
for those readers who are interested, but a few are simply listed here:
• single and multiple inheritance
• dynamic binding of objects
• polymorphism
• data abstraction and information hiding
• dynamic memory management capability
As an example of some of the features mentioned above, we might have two
unit types, rifle company and tank platoon, which are object types derived
from the more general unit object type. If we ascribe a method called
receive.order to the unit object, then we can invoke receive.order for any
object whose type inherits the unit object type. If, at some point in future
development, we wish to add a Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) platoon to the
simulation, we may choose to inherit the properties of the tank platoon object
as a starting point and then modify the fields and methods as necessary. [Ref.
11]
MODSIM II's structure and syntax were based on that of Modula-2, so
programmers familiar with Pascal, Modula-2, or Ada would have little
difficulty in learning the language. Since it is a strongly typed language, (all
variables must be declared by type), MODSIM II promotes consistency and
reduces errors in user code. This strong type checking ensures errors are
caught at compilation time rather than at run time when they would be
much harder to find. [Ref. 15]
The speed and portability of MODSIM II are a result of the C code
which is created by the system's C compiler. Compiled code means faster
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execution times, and allows it to be highly portable across mainframe, work-
stations, and PC's. Because MODSIM II supports automated separate
compilation and importation of code from modules and libraries, the
language is ideal for large projects with multiple programmers. [Ref. 15]
The same modularity that facilitates multiple programmer projects
promotes easier code maintenance and improves reliability and code
reusability. Objects and routines performing related functions can be grouped
into modules which can be put into libraries for reuse by other programs. In
this manner, such common simulation requirements as statistic collecting
and queue management are already standardized and available with the
language's built-in library.
A key area for future MCCAAM development work is the integrated
dynamic graphics available in MODSIM which can substantially reduce the
time and effort required to display results. Only a few lines of code are
needed to create dynamic icons, histograms, clocks and meters that change as
the program runs. With graphics, many results are easier to explain and
understand.
2. Object Oriented Simulation
Object-oriented simulation and object-oriented programming are
both based on the principle that the design of a system should be based on the
objects that make up the system. Three concepts characterize the difference
between object-oriented programming and object-oriented simulation:
entities, events, and simulation time. [Ref. 22]
In an object-oriented simulation some of the objects are active. They
execute independently of, and concurrently with, other active objects. These
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active objects are called entities. They are used to model the physical processes
in the system being simulated. In our case, the unit, net, and radio objects are
all examples of entities and a physical process that they model is transmitting
and receiving messages.
An event represents a change in the state of one of the objects in the
system being simulated. Entities schedule events for each other to mark
when these state changes are to occur. Events are used either to synchronize
the actions of two entities or to pass information from one entity to another.
Entitity actions and event scheduling are both tied to a logical clock
called simulation time. Simulation time is an arbitrary, application defined
time scale that is independent of real time. Each event is tied to the logical
clock through a scheduled event time. This event time corresponds to the
actual time in the physical system when the corresponding physical event
would occur. [Ref. 22]
Given the three concepts briefly explained above, constructing object-
oriented simulations involves: [Ref. 22]
• Identifying the physical processes that make up the system being
defined.
• Defining an entity class to model each type of physical process.
• Identifying all circumstances that can lead to changes in the state of the
system and characterize these as events.
• Determining when events occur and tieing them to simulation time by
means of their scheduled event time.
Like all process oriented (i.e. not discrete event) simulation paradigms, the
object-oriented simulation modeling framework has occasion to freeze a
process until some time passes, some condition becomes true, or some
resource is available. The utility offered by object-oriented simulation is that
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this waiting is done by a method of an object. In MODSIM n, an object can
have several concurrent methods waiting for different things. This allows for
autonomy of objects, promoting reusable object code.
In summary, MODSIM II is a complete, powerful, general purpose
programming and simulation language. Its features reduce design and coding
effort and improve reliability. As mentioned previously, its modularity
allows any simulation programmer to expand a simple model into a more
complex one with ease. This degree of modularity has enabled us to quickly
develop MCCAAM using three programmer authors with a graceful buildup.
[Ref.ll] The degree of dynamic interaction between many varied units in
real-world military communications requires the flexibility and structure that
object-oriented simulation affords.
C MODEL DEVELOPMENT
In order to theorize about military communications and the complex
military C3 process and to construct an appropriate model, it is useful to have
a definition of a C3 system. For our evaluation, and in concert with the
MCES system bounding requirement, a C3 system possesses the following
components [19]:
• physical entities—refers to equipment (computers and peripherals,
modems, jammers, antennas, batteries, vehicles), software, facilities,
and people.
• structure—identifies the arrangement and interrelationships of
physical entities, procedures, protocols, concepts of operation, and
information patterns. (This frequently reflects doctrine and may be
scenario dependent.)
• process—identifies the functions of the system as tasks that are being
carried out (receiving, queueing, transmitting, routing, jamming,
waiting, etc.)
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These three components were used as a baseline for modelling the
MAGTF communications architectures. The external stresses that affect all of
these basic components were another foundational consideration in
developing MCCAAM and are discussed in the following sections.
MCCAAM is intended to be used by the Marine Corps Warfighting Center
to measure communications network and architectural performance under a












Figure 8. External Model Stresses
Of the 5 major stresses listed, MCCAAM currently only models traffic,
reliability, and a limited threat. It will be useful for system engineering
functions, such as network sizing and configurations, as well as operational
planning. In can also be modified to support interoperability analysis, threat
analysis, test and evaluation planning, and any application where a
communications network ability to move traffic under battlefield conditions
is a consideration.
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The model design is based on the premise that the major mission of a
MAGTF communications network is its capability to move message traffic
during combat. Actual performance is a function of numerous battlefield
factors that affect network throughput. The main subsystems of our
MCCAAM model that simulate these battlefield factors are the
communications model, the workload model, the jamming model, and the
reliability model.
1. Communications Model
Communications requirements within a MAGTF are outlined in
[Ref. 20, 21] and depicted in MCCAAM in terms of needlines. A needline is a
series of related data elements which describe a requirement to communicate
information between two or more battlefield communicators, hereafter
described as Command and Control Facilities (C2FACs). The makeup of these
"needlines" is described in the following paragraphs which detail the
workload modelling.
The five major Marine Corps mission areas are air operations,
ground operations, intelligence, fire support and combat service support. The
MAGTF Interoperability Requirements Concepts (MIRC) contains the tasks
performed by Marine Corps communicators which are similar to the MCES
standard functions of sense, assess, generate, plan and direct. Each of these
functions is performed by a subset of the C2FACS in a MAGTF in a sequential
fashion to accomplish tasks in the five mission areas above.
To capture the sequence of message traffic required to accomplish
certain operational tasks, the Marine Corps Technical Interface Design Plan
for Marine Tactical Systems (MTS-TIDP) defines three levels of functions in
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Volume II entitled Multiple Agency Message Exchange Sequences (MAMES)
At the top level for each of the five mission areas are Marine Broad
Operations Tasks (MBOTS) such as artillery call for fire in the fire support
mission area. Each MBOT is then subdivided, for example standard fire
mission, check fire etc. These subdivisions are called Broad Operational
Subtasks (BOSTs). Each BOST is further subdivided into Message Exchange
Occurrences (MEOs). Each MEO explicitly identifies the origin and
destination C2FAC, the type of message sent and the net used for each MEO in
accomplishing the BOST as illustrated in Figure 9. In addition, each MEO
cross-references the interface task which created it and the next interface task
which its receipt supports. The normal sequence of the MEOs is roughly
indicated for each BOST. There are as many as 50 MEOs for a BOST.
The following paragraphs discuss how the actual communications
architecture was modeled in MCCAAM primarily through the interaction of
Unit, Radio, and Net Objects. Figure 10 lists the primary network objects in
MCCAAM with most of their accompanying fields(attributes) and
methods(activities).
a. Command and Control Facilities (C2FACs)
C2FACs are the agencies that process command and control
communications and are modeled as Unit Objects in MCCAAM. Since
MCCAAM simulates actual procedures to generate and route message traffic,
it needs to know what C2FACs are in the architecture, where they are located,
the single-channel nets they guard, and a few additional pieces of
information.
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The Unit Object is the base type from which we create all of the
C2FACs in MCCAAM. Instances of C2FACs range from a platoon
headquarters (~ 2 radios) to a Brigade headquarters (~ 20 radios). The
communications equipment owned by a C2FAC is stored in a radio array
which is a field of each unit object. Each radio, in turn, is a doctrinal
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Figure 9. Message Exchange Occurrences Between C2FACS
45
subscriber of a given net. Section (b) further illustrates the features of the
radio objects. The differences between unit types are found in the
composition of the radio array, the rate of BOST initiation for each type of
BOST, and the particular nets that the unit is a subscriber of.
OBJECTS FIELDS METHODS
(ENTITIES) (ATTRIBUTES) (ACTIVITIES)
Units name numRadios TELL ReceiveBostlnstance
location netType TELL ExceptionRoute
echelon radio (array) TELL KnowAboutJamming
Radios unitLoc NetType TELL Fail
netlndex Equipment ASK Start(Stop)Receiving
queue Available ASK RequestTransmission
Jammed Transmitting ASK SubmitBost
Receiving MTBF ASK Start(Stop)Transmit
NumlnQ NumMessAtt ASK Become(Un)Jammed
Nets Netlndex NetDescriptor TELL EnterNet
Type PropagateMode TELL ChangeFreq
Netldle Equipment TELL ExecuteBusyPeriod
Frequency Netjammed ASK SelectRadio
Mean AcknowledgeTime ASK NextTraffic
RadioList (linked list) ASK ConstructWaitingList
SelectedRadio TELL TransmissionDelay





Figure 10. Partial Attribute and Activity Summary for Major MCCAAM
Network Objects
Each BOST is pursued via the execution of MEOs between units.
After a unit receives an MEO, it checks the BOST to determine the next MEO
and determines the appropriate net using the route procedure. Figure 11
shows the interactions between the units, nets, and the traffic generator. [Ref.
11]
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As currently modeled, the main method that the Unit object
owns is the ReceiveBostlnstance method which takes an incoming MEO,
checks it for accuracy, and then takes appropriate action as required. There are
circumstances under which the unit will not be able to reach some of the
intended receivers on the net specified in the BOST. Thus, the
ReceiveBostlnstance method makes a call to a complex routing routine which




Figure 11. Interaction Between TrafficGenerator, Units, and Net
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b. Radios
The radio object, as mentioned earlier, models the actual
characteristics and actions of the tactical radios in our simulation. Each radio
object has its own fields and methods which distinguish its existence and
performance capabilities within the simulation model. Fields which identify
whether or not the radio is down for repair, currently being jammed, or
currently transmitting all help to track the individual performance of each
radio. Instances of the radio object in MCCAAM currently are the members of
the VRC-12 family and the SINCGARS radio as well as HF radios which are
often used as an alternate route for VHF traffic. The main field that the radio
object owns is a prioritized queue which is used to hold the MEOs that the
radio is waiting to transmit. By means of this queue, we are able to monitor
the number of waiting messages and, over time, gather a picture of which
radios are used the most. From within the radio object, we also track the
number of message attempts and completions for each radio. As illustrated
in the unit description section, each radio object is owned by a unit and is
located in that particular unit's radio array where it can be accessed when
needed.
The main methods that the radio base-type owns are the
RequestTransmission method, the SubmitBost method, Becomejammed
method, and the Fail method.
c Nets
Voice radio nets are central to our problem; as part of their
respective object descriptions, they have access to the different radio object
types that we are concerned with (VRC-12 family and SINCGARS). They are
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a target of enemy jamming, a resource that is tied up by a message
transmission, and a method for re-routing traffic when a primary net is not
available between any two C2FACs. For the results of any MCCAAM analysis
to be meaningful, it is imperative that the nets and the units that are
subscribers of these nets reflect the actual nets and net memberships that are
relevant to the question at hand. In this case, the allocation of new
SHMCGARS radios.
The net object is the base type from which all the various
MAGTF nets are created and linked together to form the communications
architecture of MCCAAM. Since radio net transmission time is the only
limited resource in our model (besides radios) the modeling of this resource
is key to how the model simulates the actual message handling of specified
nets.
A net may be thought of as a one-talker-at-a-time party line
where all the unit subscribers of the net have the opportunity to hear every
message that is transmitted on the net, but only one subscriber may transmit
at any time.
The nets in our model use a highest-priority-first discipline,
which may be slightly more orderly than an actual tactical communication
process. When an opportunity for transmission takes place, (i.e. the net
becomes idle), the net polls each of its subscribers using its NextTraffic
method and randomly chooses one of the units with a highest priority
message waiting in queue This reflects reality in that if several units are all
trying to gain access to a net with equal priority traffic, the winner really is a
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random draw. This queueing discipline is easily varied by changing the
ExecuteBusyPeriod method of the net.
The other main method that the net objects own is the
ChangeFreq method which causes the current net frequency being used by
fixed frequency radios to change in a user-defined periodic fashion. This
method is also called when a fixed frequency radio is jammed and cannot
work through the jamming. The jammer objects, as defined later, check
specific frequency bands and if no net is transmitting in that range band while
the jammer is scanning, the net avoids being jammed. See Figure 11 on page
47 for an illustration of the jammer/net/unit interaction.
2. Workload Model
Stochastic workload models are normally used to drive
communication system models. As mentioned previously, these range from
simple low-resolution models that generate messages according to stationary
Poisson processes to extremely high-resolution models that try to simulate
the actual evolution of combat with all of its inherent communications. [Ref.
29]
In order to test the value of a specific communications architecture,
we must stress the system in a realistic fashion. However, we want our
conclusions to be independent of a specific scenario of events. Through
application of the Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure
(MCES), we have developed a paradigm for workload modeling that lies
between the extremes mentioned above. It exploits the information
promulgated in the Technical Interface Design Plan (TIDP) Vol II as described
in the section on the communications model. The structure of this
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document, which clearly defines each of these items and their
interdependences, makes it possible to generate realistically interdependent
message traffic without resorting to a specific scenario. This generation
process is detailed in the following paragraphs. [Ref. 29]
To generate traffic for the MAGTF communication system, we
generate a sequence of BOSTS which are initiated by specific units within the
force. Each unit, ;, in the MAGTF has a particular rate of occurrence, X[\, for
each of the BOSTs, i, that it could possibly originate. Each Bost-Unit
combination (i,j) initiates a particular BOST with its own rate relative to the
other BOSTs and other units within MCCAAM. For our current model, the
rates that are employed are best estimates from a surveyed panel of officers.
For efficiency and centralization of control, we generate instances of
BOSTs from a BOST master list <which is easily manipulated as a data file) in
a central process:
while (not TIME'S UP)
sample DELAY with mean = 1Ar
wait DELAY
choose a BOST and UNIT
tell UNIT to INITIATE BOST
end while
where X = J\. \&u> For a straightforward initiation with no intensity
factor, r=l. Given BOST i and unit j, the BOST-unit combination (i,j) is
chosen from a multinomial distribution with probability Aj.-/A. If the
central delays are chosen to be exponential, then each BOST-unit initiation is
a filtered Poisson process. Otherwise, each time between BOST-unit initiation
is a sum of a geometric number of iid delays.
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An example of an operational task in offensive operations is Artillery
Call For Fire, with the constituent BOST, Standard Call For Fire. This BOST
might be initiated by a Battery Forward Observer (BTRY FO), and it involves
the cooperation of the Artillery Battalion Fire Direction Center (BN FDC), the
Battalion Fire Support Coordination Center (BN FSCC), and the Artillery
Battery Fire Direction Center (BTRY FDC) The MEOs which are required to
complete the Standard Call for Fire BOST include the original call for fire, the
clearing of the fire mission up the chain of command, the replaying of the
clearance back down the chain, the spotting and firing directions exchanged
between the BTRY FO and the BTRY FDC, the end of mission and
surveillance messages. This BOST is a good example of how realistic traffic is
produced in that there are concurrent messages that go out over monitored
nets, conditional response type messages, and a real-world precedence
structure between the MEOs. [Ref. Ill The MEOs that need to be sequentially
accomplished for this BOST are illustrated in Figure 12.
Each specified message within a BOST has associated with it a
message format which identifies the message originator, receivers, net to be
used, and a duration. The duration is a modelling addition which allows us
to control how long the particular message will "occupy" or tie-up a radio net.
A list of the specific MEOs required for the completion of each BOST is given
in the TIDP Vol II along with a comprehensive description of the MEO.
Therefore, the workload of our communications network is the complete set
of message durations of all the MEOs that must occur to complete all of the
BOSTs initiated by all the units in the simulation.
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\/ REGT y^ ' Dotted Lines represent "As Required'
message traffic ...
Figure 12. Example BOST: Standard FO Fire Mission
53
An interesting challenge in modelling military communications
beyond the usual deterministic point-to-point, one-level message traffic, is
that many times messages are intended as broadcast type messages which are
intended for all children nodes on a family tree. We model this facet of
military communications with a simple BOST designation: PointToPoint or
Broadcast. The MEOs within a Broadcast BOST are cloned on-the-fly to meet
the intended receiver requirements. In this manner, the conditional nature
of our workload paradigm is greatly magnified and exercised. This facet of
MCCAAM alone distinguishes it from normal communication simulation
models.
To achieve realism, we specify several aspects of a general situation
for our MCCAAM environment that help determine the extent of the
MBOTS that will be involved. For example, the assumption that our MAGTF
is already ashore and engaged eliminates the use of the MBOT "Warfighting
Ship to Shore Operations." Based on the assumed information about the
units involved in the MAGTF simulation (i.e. location and mission), we can
more realistically specify the relative frequency with which each unit initiates
each type of BOST. For example, an infantry battalion in reserve will not be
initiating as many calls for fire as will a battalion engaged in a forward area of
operations. The object-oriented nature of our model will allow very easy and
graceful upgrades to include any level of detail desired in the actual simulated
environment. As mentioned before though, our emphasis in modeling was
only to include those elements of the tactical environment that would
directly affect the communications process.
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The use of the MBOT/BOST/MEO framework briefly discussed above
allows us to model the tasks that any given MAGTF communications
network would be required to undertake without mimicking detailed
attrition engagements. We initiate BOSTs according to a static, stationary
process and let the workload paradigm provide the realism; we get the
communications realism of a combat model without the large development
costs or narrow focus. This structure also allows us to compare alternative
architectures under varying workloads without sacrificing realism; we simply
adjust the rate (intensity) of the BOST initiation process. [Ref. 29]
3. Jamming
Significant radio jamming threats exist in several of the world's areas
of interest. MCCAAM includes a model of these threats to provide a realistic
environment for communications system evaluation. This is especially
important because the SBMCGARS radios, with their frequency hopping
capability, are much more resistant to jamming than the current radios as
Figure 13 illustrates. Thus, the relative value of a specific architecture of old
and new radios is largely measured in the ability to perform critical
communications in the presence of jamming.
a. EW Definition and Scope
Electronic Warfare is any military action involving the use of
electromagnetic energy to exploit, reduce, or deny the enemy use of the
electromagnetic spectrum. Normally, the electromagnetic warfare arena is
broken down into three separate functional areas. The first, electronic
support measures (ESM) pertains to those measures related to electronic
search, interception, and location. The second area is that of electronic
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counter measures (ECM), which is the active portion of the electronic warfare
arena. ECM involves jamming employment and the use of other equipment
to disrupt the use of communications or noncommunications devices in the
electromagnetic spectrum. Imitative deception falls into this category. The
third functional area is that of electronic counter counter measures (ECCM).
ECCM deals with those measures that a force takes to ensure friendly use of
the electromagnetic spectrum and to reduce enemy ESM and ECM











Key: A - Frequency-hopping net
B - Fixed-frequency net
# - Jamming effects
Figure 13. Effects of Jamming on Fixed Frequency and Frequency Hopping
Radios [Ref. 10]
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b. Enemy EW Techniques
To provide an example of how enemy ESM and ECM resources
are expected to be utilized, Figure 14 is provided. Note that within 25 seconds
after transmitting, a station is expected to be intercepted and its approximate
location identified. Within three minutes, some type of ECM action such as
incoming artillery fire or jamming can be expected. [Ref. 10] These times, of
course, are based on optimal conditions favoring enemy electronic warfare
efforts. Terrain obstacles, transmission time, power output, antenna
directivity, and movement all play important roles in the success of
electronic warfare. All are variables that can be modeled to reflect reality more
closely, but the important factor that we considered was this: does it help to
delineate between competing radio architectures?
There are many types of jamming signals that may be used
against a targeted receiver. Some will be quite difficult to detect and in some
cases impossible. For this reason, an operator must always be alert to the
probability of jamming and react according to local unit standard operating
procedures (SOP). Other jamming signals are clearly noticed as such. The
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Figure 14. Example Threat Jamming Procedures
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c. Enemy EW Impact on Communications
Radio operators must be able to determine whether or not their
radios are being jammed. As was mentioned in the previous paragraph, this
is not always an easy task. Threat jammers may employ obvious or subtle
jamming techniques. These techniques may consist of powerful
unmodulated or noise-modulated carrier signals transmitted to the operator's
receiver. Unmodulated jamming signals are characterized by a lack of noise.
If radio operators suspect that their radios are the targets of threat
jamming, there are many procedures which help them to make this
determination and re-establish communications. If tests indicate the
probability of jamming being present, the operator would follow local SOP to
reestablish communications and also to initiate a Meaconing, Intrusion,
Jamming and Interference (MIJI) Report informing highter headquarters of
the jamming. [Ref. 27]
As difficult as it can be to detect jamming, even more so, the
modeling of the many possible forms of jamming is very complex and
difficult to implement. The next section details how we implement the
jammer/receiver interaction and the subsequent communications time delay
that results.
d. Modeling Enemy EW
As mentioned previously, the only electronic warfare modelled
in this thesis focuses primarily on the enemy's ability to jam friendly
transmissions. The modeling of interception and direction finding will add
to the resolution of the model, but we assumed it would not necessarily help
to distinguish between alternative system configurations.
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To include the enemy jamming threat and resultant stress in
our network model we developed the jammer object. We describe its fields
and methods in Appendix A. The JammerMasterList is an array in
MCCAAM that contains references to all the specific jammers included in any
given simulation run and is used to access specific jammers by name or
location throughout the simulation run. The user controls the modeling of
jammer interaction with a simple boolean variable in the run data file.
If jamming is to be incorporated in a given run, the jammers
residing in the jammer data file are created and can be activated at any
particular time. After creation of each jammer object, the SelectTarget
procedure is called to find all the units currently within the jammer's range
and operational sector. If a unit is within range and sector and is transmitting
over any fixed-frequency radios, the JammerObj then checks to see if those
radios are operating within the frequency range he is currently monitoring. If
so, the jammer then proceeds to jam those radios for a user determined
length of time. The effect of this jamming is to make the radios unavailable
for receiving any more MEOs from the particular net that it is a subscriber of.
Note that as in the real EW environment, the jammer only affects the
receiving radios—not the transmitters. This will have the effect of slowing
down the BOST completion times and create delays throughout the network.
To what extent this jamming will impact the architecture's overall




There is a significant improvement in mean time between failures
(MTBF) with the adoption of the new SINCGARS radios. This improvement
is discussed in Chapter IV. MCCAAM reflects this improvement in terms of
the overall system's operation through reduced radio failures and down time.
This section provides some brief background into how we approached the
modelling of this critical area.
Generally, it is more informative to study times between failures,
rather than numbers of failures, for a continuous time communication
system. The most commonly used model for describing the times between
failures for such a continuous time system is the exponential model. In order
to model a radio system's failure as an exponential distribution, the following
conditions are required and were assumed to be true in MCCAAM:
• the radio system is as good as new after each repair,
• the probability of failure in any given interval of time is the same no
matter how old a system is and no matter how many failures it has
experienced.
The second condition above is an intuitive description of the
memory-less property. For electronic oriented hardware like the radios in
our model, this memory-less property is not an unrealistic assumption since
modern day electronics, once past burn-in, tend to exhibit a no wear-out
lifetime. A future embellishment in this area would be to model the
reliability failures with some form of Weibull distribution where the radios
would exhibit some form of wear-out over time. The possible benefits from
such a model embellishment are the topic of another current thesis. [Ref. 23]
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Given the reliability background above, we proceed now to briefly
discuss the implementation of reliability modelling in MCCAAM.
Initial reliability failures are generated/scheduled to occur for each
radio in the simulation at the beginning of each simulation run based on a
random draw from the exponential distribution. The mean time between
failures (MTBF) for the given type of radio is used as the mean parameter for
the exponential draw. When a scheduled reliability failure comes up on the
simulation "calendar/' the boolean AVAILABLE field of the radio is changed
to FALSE. This causes an interruption in traffic transmission if the radio is
in use at the time. If the radio was not in use at the time of the failure, its
unavailability is modeled by causing that radio object to wait for that radio
type's mean time to repair. Once a radio's modeled repair time is completed,
it becomes available again for processing further traffic. It is at this point that
modelling redundancy, in the form of radio spares, would impact
communications performance.
Although we collect the number of radio failures for each type of
radio in MCCAAM, a measure of effectiveness of our communications
system reliability is not implemented in this analysis. Analysis of system
reliability, availability, and maintainability is a recommendation for future
study discussed in Chapter VII.
5. Random Variables
The necessary stochastic elements of MCCAAM are obtained through
random number draws from the following distributions:
• Relative frequency of BOSTs is obtained by drawing the mean inter-
generation time from a gamma distribution with mean and shape
parameter determined by the user.
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• NextTraffic. When a net is polling all of its subscribers to see who will
have the next opportunity to send traffic, if there is a tie for highest
priority traffic, then there is a random draw to determine which unit
gets the privilege. The random draw is from a uniform distribution [0,
number of subscribers].
• Message durations are currently deterministic, but the code is in place
to allow messages to vary according to a normal distribution with
mean and variance defined by the user.
• Radio failure times are drawn from an exponential distribution with
mean time between failures as key parameter.
• Jamming sector and frequency band are random draws from a uniform
distribution.
• Frequencies of fixed-frequency radios are drawn from uniform
distribution [33.0, 88.0].
D. MODULE DESCRIPTIONS AND RESOLUTION
As described in section B of this chapter, MODSIM is a modular language
which allows separate compilation of blocks of code. Once a module has
been compiled, its routines, types, variables, and data structures may be
imported and used by other modules. [Ref. 15]
There are two major types of modules in MODSIM:
• Main Modules
• Library Modules
Since MCCAAM takes full advantage of MODSIM's modularity and is not
housed in one large main module, the bulk of the simulation code is found
in the library modules. There are two parts to a Library Module: the
DEFINITION MODULE and the IMPLEMENTATION MODULE. The
definition module contains descriptions of those aspects of the library module
which can be imported by other modules and it acts as a type of summary for
a particular object's characteristics and abilities. The implementation module
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contains the code which implements the functionality of the module; this is
where the main logic and conditioning procedures and methods are detailed.
Although a very significant amount of this thesis work was in the actual
development, writing, compiling and debugging of the MODSIM code that
makes up MCCAAM, the extensive number of modules that are used (more
than 70) will not be detailed here in the body of the thesis. Appendix G is a
listing of all the modules and gives an indication of the nature of the
modules that were created. Module summaries listing the fields and
methods of the key objects are found in Appendix D. For those that are
interested in the actual implementation code, the MCCAAM users manual
[Ref. 32] contains a synopsis of the tasks each of the modules performs within
a simulation run.
The level of resolution, (the level of detail that was modeled in the
communication process) found in MCCAAM was dependent on whether or
not the added detail would affect the system 's performance when different
radio technologies were used. Resolution is summarized for MCCAAM's
major objects below:
• Units : Simply a base object for the C2FACs, only the location, number
of radios, types or radios, nets subscribed to and echelon of the unit are
modeled. No movement or firepower attributes modeled.
• Nets : Besides name, propagation mode, frequency and subscriber radio
* types, the Net Obj keeps track of whether it is idle or not and if it is
being jammed. It maintains a linked list of all subscriber radios.
• Radios : The radios are modeled at the operational level. No specific
internal functions are modeled. The Radio Object keeps track of
whether it is transmitting, receiving, being jammed, or idle. It tracks
the number of messages waiting in its transmission queue and how
many transmissio attempts it has made. It knows its type, frequency,
location, parent unit and whether or not it is "down" for a reliability
failure. Antenna types, heights, and radio power are not brought into
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the model yet. Effects of terrain and weather are not considered as
impacting transmissions.
• Jammers: Leaving much room for embellishment, the jammers are
also modeled at the operational level,. The jammers have an
operating band width, a max range, a location, and an alternating sector
of search. They keep track of the number of attempts and successed
when jamming units within range, sector, and band width. The
direction finding process is not modeled in detail. Different types of
jamming are not modeled. Jammer movement is not modeled.
Jammer knowledge of high priority target nets is not modeled.
E MCCAAM PROGRAM FLOW
1. Model Runtime Environment
MCCAAM is embedded in a run-time environment (Figure 15)
which includes:




The MCCAAM database consists of specifications of the units, nets,
and BOSTs which are to be examined for potential use. The user has the
opportunity to adopt a baseline MEU, MEB, or MEF configuration, and then
to revise these configurations to suit the precise force or architecture under
study. The user can save the constructed system under a user-specified name
for future use. All of the database functions are menu driven and self
explanatory.
Model control is the stage where the user may exert control on the
behavior of some of the objects. There are several ON/OFF choices to be
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Figure 15. MCCAAM Simulation Flow
for the run, the method of jammer target selection, and several other
features. The user also specifies the duration of the model run, and the initial
value of the traffic workload rate.
Model execution is the phase where the model constructs sample
paths of communications network specified. MCCAAM differs from most
computer simulations in that all of the objects in the simulation are
dynamically constructed using the data found in the database. That is, the
program itself has no units, nets, radios, or C2FACs. The simulation contains
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only specifications of the behavior of these objects. Thus, the program
instantiates the MAGTF communications network, the BOSTs, and the traffic
generator with whatever size, scope, and relationships are described in the
database. [Ref. 11]
The output analysis stage of the run-time environment is described
in Chapter VI.
2. MCCAAM: An Inside View
To further detail the events that comprise an instance of MCCAAM,
the following list shows the general order that is followed upon execution:
cl SimBuild
Events occuring prior to simulation start:
• Global variables initialized and read in from data files.
• Traffic Generator and Penalty Accumulator created and initialized.
• All nets created based on user chosen data file.
• For each unit that is created:
i) Radios are created and initialized
ii) Units are made subscribers on appropriate nets.
iii) Appropriate BOSTs are connected to units for future traffic.
• For each BOST, MEO durations are read in from data file and specific
messages are initiated.
b. SimRun
The following events occur during execution:
Traffic Generator initiates BOST occurrences at BOST specified rates
Units are selected to initiate respective BOSTs
BOST transmission packet and associated records created from BOST
master file.
Appropriate MEOs for BOST obtained for transmission by Unit.
Timers for BOSTs created and all fields assigned.
All Units that will initiate BOSTs are told to receive BOST "instances"
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• For each BOST, the following cycle occurs:
+ Completion status checked and updated.
+ Route procedure called to begin transmission of MEOs
* Transmission Radios on proper net obtained
(wait if not available).
* Net entered.
* Destination location obtained
* Destination radio checked to see if active and on the net.
* Alternate route determined if appropriate.
+ MEO transmitted—if more than one receiver, MEO is cloned.
+ Appropriate message duration time ties up net, then net is
released and MEO terminated.
• Repeat cycle from the top.
While the cycle of MEO transmission, reception, routing, and waiting
is going on, each BOST's Timer is running. A method periodically checks
each BOST to see if all of its MEOs are completed. If they are, and all were
completed before the allowed time for that BOST, the Timer is interrupted
and disposed of. Otherwise, penalty information is obtained from the Timer
object and assessed until the BOST is either completed or perishes, or the
simulation ends.
F. DATA INPUT, REQUIREMENTS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
As with any simulation model that desires to reflect reality in some
respect, one of the most difficult areas to overcome in developing MCCAAM
was the collection and construction of data needed to drive the simulation
sub-systems. When we learned that the Warfighting Center could not
provide the workload data base, we selected the BOST, MEO workload
structure as described previously. Using the Marine Corps Tactical
Communications Architecture (MCTCA) and the Technical Interface Design
Plan (TIDP), we discovered that the selection of appropriate nets, BOSTs, and
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message lengths to include in the analysis was not a straightforward process.
[Ref. 28] Typical difficulties we encountered were:
• The documents provided (MCTCA, TIDP, and MIRC) were written for
a MEF sized MAGTF. Therefore considerable expert screening,
alteration, and augmentation was required to build the information for
aMEB.
• Each MEO requires transmission between two command and control
facilities (C2FACs), but messsage numbers and durations were often
missing.
• Expert judgment was required to select a subset of the BOSTs to include
in the analysis. If no net for any MEO in a BOST was to be involved in
the SINCGARS architecture, the BOST was not included.
• Some non-VHF/FM nets should be included as alternative routes
when the primary net is being jammed, but the proper subset requires
expert judgment based on the BOSTs and C2FACs already selected.
The following bullets highlight the major areas of data input
requirements and our corresponding assumptions[Ref. 29]:
• Requirements: BOST applicability to model level, relative frequencies
of BOSTs for particular types of units, allotted time for each BOST, one-
time penalty, penalty rates, pierishability point.
Assumptions: Since no sources could be found for determining
doctrinal relative frequencies for these BOSTs, (Desert Storm data is a
future, possible lead) we have made best guess estimates. These
relative frequencies of occurrence can be easily changed by any analyst,
and since our focus is architecture selection, not precise modeling of
the real traffic, the frequency information need only be reliable enough
to judge the relative worth of different architectures. Easily modified,
these input data values are the same across simulation runs comparing
different architectures.
• Requirement: Intensity of overall traffic flow
Assumption: Given that we are interested in a given network's
operational capacity at times of intense stress, this parameter is easily
modified to provide increasing message traffic.
• Requirement: Sufficient, pertinent message traffic to stress network
Assumption : Of the 184 BOSTs listed in the TIDP Vol. II, only a
limited subset of BOSTs is included, but those that are have been
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screened to ensure applicability to the nets included in the given
network. Since all possible messages are not being stimulated and we
need to sufficiently stress the network, we increase the rate that the
limited BOSTs are generated until we can analyze periods of heavy
traffic.
• Requirement: Scenario Data
Assumption: MEB sized MAGTF is engaged in desert combat. Unit
locations and collocations per general doctrine. Radio allocations
made within doctrinal table of organization (TO) to support respective
analysis objectives.
• Requirement: Appropriate Jammer data
Assumption: Since not modelling the direction finding equipment or
process, we assume that the target selection has already taken place.
This is modelled in zero-time. Once the threat jammer has targets in
range, in sector, and in band-width, we assume each jammer is only
effective in his specified range and jamming band width. We assume
all jammers use an overt jamming method such as barrage jamming
with noise.
Our model is intentionally designed to facilitate easy specification,
modification, or re-specification of the input data. This is accomplished
through an extensive, interactive, menu driven program called DB (Database
Build) which allows a user to choose any MAGTF level (MEU,MEB, or MEF)
and any of the main building block areas of data specification (Unit, Net, Bost,
MEO, Jammer) to input, alter, or cross reference. Through the use of this very
helpful set of data manipulation routines, the Warfighting Center (WFC) or
any other user can verify which units are attached to which nets, and which
units generate specific BOSTs as well as a host of other items of interest.
The following list itemizes most of the input variables that a MCCAAM
user might be interested in changing:
Units: name, location, number of radios
Nets: name, number of subscribers,
Radios: MTBF, type, net index
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Jammers: name, location, range, effective band width
Messages: descriptor, duration
BOSTS: descriptor, precedence, alloted time, one-time penalty, penalty rate,
perishability, number of MEOs, initiators
Simulation Run Data: scenario stop time, number of replications, model
jammers, model failures, max message re-trials, MEO duration
variabilily, mean acknowledgement time, acknowledgement
variability, time between frequency changes, net entry times by radio
type
Traffic Generator: pace, interstimulation time, intensity rate
G. MODEL SPECIFICATION SUMMARY
The following bullets provide a brief summary of interesting model
specifics:
IMPLEMENTATION LANGUAGE: MODSIM II vs. 1.6 with
SIMGRAPHICS vs. 1.3
SIMULATION CLASSIFICATION: Process-oriented, discrete event
Effective for Terminating and Steady-State Analysis
More than 70 modules
More than 30,000 lines of code
Portable across computing architectures:
* Initially developed on PC (DOS)
* Moved to SUN workstation (UNIX)
Extensive, menu-driven data base manipulation program
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IV. MEASURES OF SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
A. GENERAL
Judicious use of operational systems, such as a MAGTF communications
architecture, requires an understanding of how to measure the performance
and relative contributions of sub-system components to mission success. This
understanding is greatly enhanced by the proper selection and study of
appropriate measures of effectiveness (MOEs). In dealing with the issues of
system performance, the analytic community has developed the following set
of inter-related terms to use when evaluating the behavior of system: [Ref. 5]
• Dimensional Parameters
• Measure (Variables) of Performance (MOPs)
• Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs)
• Measures of Force Effectiveness (MOFEs)
Agreement has not been reached about how the general terms mentioned
above can be explicitly defined to be comprehensive and distinguishable from
one another. Therefore, the following definitions are presented for use in
this thesis [Ref. 5]:
• Dimensional Parameters—Properties or characteristics inherent in the
radios whose values determine communication behavior and the
structure under question, even when at rest (size, weight, number of
frequencies, power output).
• Measures of Performance—Closely related to inherent parameters
(physical and structural) but measure attributes of independent radio
behavior (gain, throughput, signal-to-noise ratio).
• Measures of Effectiveness—Measure of how the system performs its
functions within an operational environment (speed of service,
percentage of transmissions jammed, number of messages requiring re-
routing).
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• Measures of Force Effectiveness—Measure of how a given
communication system and the force (sensors, weapons, vehicles) of
which it is a part performs missions (i.e. how does it contribute to battle
outcome). This thesis, as mentioned before, does not attempt to
determine directly any such force effectiveness measures.
MOEs are measured relative to some standard, which is often implicitly
how a perfect system would perform. We use a variation of this standard in
that a baseline system's performance is used to compare system performance
across the areas of interest. Since the VRC-12 family of radios have been
around for a long time and there is much corporate knowledge, both
technical and subjective, about its strengths and weaknesses, we use it as the
standard when assessing the qualitative MOEs. [Ref. 5]
It is an accepted fact that MOEs, as well as MOFEs, are related to the
operational context of the model and to assumed enemy actions. As such,
they are always inherently scenario dependent to some extent. To help avoid
this problem in MCCAAM, we allow the user complete freedom to change
those factors that will impact communications performance. For example, we
focus on jamming as the key aspect of enemy electronic counter measures
(ECM) abilities. The amount and extent of enemy jamming can be quickly
changed to provide easy sensitivity analysis as this factor is changed.
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF MEASURES
Performance and effectiveness measures can be characterized by their
physical and analytic attributes. [Ref. 5:p 6-12] Analytic attributes are desirable
characteristics that can serve as a useful guide to analysts in selecting
appropriate measures. The following four characteristics are considered by
many to be particularly critical to a successful analysis and were used in
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deciding which measures to apply to MCCAAM analysis. Additional criteria
for evaluation measures are listed in Table 2.
• Mission Oriented—The measure selected should be related to a clearly
defined statement of the mission, or objective, of the system under
analysis. This statement provides explicit or implicit information
regarding the standards involved.
• Discriminatory—Measures must discriminate sufficiently so that real
differences among alternatives can be readily identified. Without this
measurement capability, important information can be obscured.
• Measurable—A measure must represent a measurable concept. Data
collection must be possible in some form. As a general rule, values are
assigned to measures on the basis of observations acquired through the
use of a broad range of analytic tools. As in the case of three of our
MOEs, the historical availability or ease of acquiring extensive data
necessary to quantify a measure often precludes assigning objective
values.
• Quantitative—It is preferable for ease in analysis that measures be
quantifiable. For example, a numerical one-dimensional measure
facilitates both the (univariate) ranking of alternatives and the (multi-
variate) combination of measures. The process by which the measures
are combined is generally made easier (but certainly not trivial) if the
values of the various measures can be specified as numerical
quantities.
TABLE 2. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION MEASURES [REF. 5]
CHARACTERISTICS DEFINITION
Realistic Relates realistically to the C2 system and associated
uncertainties
Objective Can be defined or derived, independent of subjective
opinion
Appropriate Relates to acceptable standards and analysis
objectives
Sensitive Reflects changes in system variables
Inclusive Reflects those standards required by the analysis
objectives
Independent Is mutually exclusive with respect to other measures
Simple Is easily understood by the user
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As an application of the need for mission-oriented and discriminatory
MOEs, consider the fact that measures used for communications acquisition
management would probably be inappropriate for evaluating communication
system performance for jamming robustness. With this in mind, we don't
view the measures specified in Section C as any sort of super set, but simply a
set that seems to meet the need for this particular application. A careful
review of current and alternative measures would be needed if a different
decision problem was in question.
C SELECTION AND SPECIFICATION OF MEASURES
Since the actual system we are concerned with does not yet exist (a fully
integrated SINCGARS and VRC-12 family MAGTF architecture), the only
approach to assigning values for the MOEs we selected is through simulated
data and conditions and historical data from existing systems. The process we
followed for obtaining the quantitative MOEs from MCCAAM is illustrated
in Figure 16.
The Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) we use to evaluate the level of
performance of distinct tactical FM communication configurations in a given
MAGTF are listed below. ("S" denotes MOEs measured on a qualitative scale
while "Q" indicates quantitative measures from MCCAAM simulation runs.)
• (S) Network Construction (NC)
• (S) Net Maintenance (NM)
• (S) Information Protection (EP)
• (Q) Timeliness (T)
• (Q) Protection from Jamming (PJ)
• (Q) Grade of Service (GOS)





















Figure 16. Modelled System Analysis [Ref. 5]
The seven MOEs we chose are a subset of many that could be included for
a tactical communications system. Only those that met the characteristics
listed in section B were selected for this analysis. Emphasis was placed on
measures that would discriminate between the radios of interest. For a more
complete list of possible communication MOEs, see [10] and [33].
Three of the seven MOEs chosen are qualitatively assessed while the
other four are assessed quantitatively. The four MOEs judged to have the
most significant impact in evaluating communications performance are
quantitatively assessed using MCCAAM. Through the use of our
communications model, we can more adequately compare the major
differences between competing architectures. The remaining 3 MOEs are
qualitatively assessed using the criterion scale illustrated in Table 3 since no
means currently exist to capture these measures from the model. The
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baseline for the criterion scale listed in Table 3 represents the minimum U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) performance criteria for a
tactical FM communications system. This criteria is used because the Army
has performed the most extensive testing and analysis of current U.S. radio
systems. Historical performance criteria of the AN//VRC-12 series and the
AN/PRC-77 family radios are used for the baseline value when the
minimum TRADOC criterion is classified or if the standard was not available.
[Ref. 10:p. 70]
TABLE 3. CRITERION SCALE
Weight Criteria
10 Superior (MOE is the most important factor which causes system
to outperform baseline).
8 Much more effective than baseline.
7 More effective than baseline.
6 Slightly better than baseline.
5 Baseline.
4 Slightly worse than baseline (marginally acceptable).
3 Less effective than baseline.
2 Much less effective than baseline.
Inferior (MOE does not meet minimum essential requirements,
unacceptable).
D. DESCRIPTION AND RELEVANCE OF MEASURES
The seven MOEs identified in the section above will now be examined
individually by definition and by identification of those variables that affect
the level of MOE assessment. The standard that is used as a baseline for each
measure is also identified for those three measures not obtained through
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MCCAAM. Though not explicitly discussed, the mission oriented,
discriminatory, measurable nature of the MOEs is illustrated in each case.
1. Network Construction
a. Definition
Network construction is defined as those actions that are
required to make network frequency assignments at a decentralized level, the
effort required to train net control station (NCS) operators on the procedures
to establish a net, and the performance of the radio operator during network
establishment. In the FM communications system described in this thesis,
the Brigade and Regimental Communications-Electronics Officers are
responsible for managing frequencies in their designated geographical areas.
The NCS operators control and manage the operation of specific nets, and
radio operators are responsible for understanding and executing proper
network procedures.
Technological advances are usually accompanied by an increase
in operational and procedural complexity. The Network Construction MOE
is used to discriminate between the operational and procedural complexity
differences of the AN/VRC-12 radios and the SINCGARS radios. It is a
subjective assessment of the increased training effort required at all levels of
operation within the FM communications system to implement the new
SINCGARS radios.
b. Variables Affecting the Network Construction MOE
The amount of effort required to establish a net can be
determined from the amount of time that it takes to enter each radio station
into the net. The variables that influence the amount of time are [Ref. 10] the
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skill levels of the radio operators, NCS operators, and communications
officers, the amount of training that they have received, the complexity of the
equipment, and the procedural complexity of operation.
A subjective evaluation of this MOE will be made with the
following assumptions:
• The administrators and users of the FM communications system have
an average skill level compared to all Marines.
• The complexity of equipment and procedural operation determines the
amount of required training.
c. Baseline Criteria
The amount of time required to train general purpose users on
AN/VRC-12 series radios is used as a baseline criteria. Specific figures for
testing requirements and scores collected by various Army testing agencies
are detailed in [Ref. 10].
d. Alternative Radio Assessments
The following findings and observations were used to make a
subjective evaluation, and determine criteria scores for the alternative radio
configurations examined in this thesis.
• Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center (ECAC) personnel feel
that the electronic remote fill (ERF) capability of the frequency-hopping
radio requires an NCS operator with special training commensurate
with an additional skill identifier. They cite the SINCGARS-V
Maturity Operational Test (MOT) [Ref. 35] as an example where there
was a high net establishment failure rate, and some net operators with
a rank of E-6 took as long as eight hours to give all stations in the net
the correct ERF variable. [Ref.10: p 87]
• SINCGARS NCS operators need a higher skill level and require more
intensive and repetitive training that normal radio operators.
• SINCGARS frequency-hopping operator skills require extensive hands-
on training to acquire, and repetitive application to retain.
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• Net establishment times have been reduced, however the times still
remain greater than for single-channel operation. Operators are not
able to commit frequency-hopping skills to memory because of their
complexity and number of precise actions required to complete them.
• The 49 SINCGARS radio human engineering problems identified
during the MOT will unnecessarily increase training time and
requirements.
The MOE criterial score for each radio alternative configuration
is based on the information presented in this section. The values were
obtained from MOP utility values published in the Concept Formulation
Package for SINCGARS [Ref. 3]. The results from testing the AN/VRC-12
radio represent the baseline criteria for the Network Construction MOE.
DESCRIPTION SCORE
Conventional Single-Channel FM w/COMSEC1 5
SINCGARS-V w/imbedded COMSEC, Frequency Hopping 3
Mixed SINCGARS and Conventional FM Environment 3-5
The criteria score for the mixed environment is determined by
the number of subscribers on SINCGARS nets and the number of subscribers
on conventional AN/VRC-12 series nets.
For example, if 60 percent of an architecture's nets were
conventional fixed-frequency nets and this totaled 120 fixed-frequency
subscribers, then each of those subscribers would have to join its given net
with a score of 5. If the other 40 percent were SINCGARS nets with 80
subscribers, then each of the SINCGARS subscribers would be able to join
1 COMSEC refers to Communications Security equipment which encrypts
messages before they are transmitted.
80
their nets with a lower score of 3 to reflect a more complex, time-consuming
net construction process.
The resulting Network Construction MOE would be:
(120)*5 + (80)*3 = 840/200 subscribers = 4.2
and would reflect the fact that this architecture was closer to the baseline
standard of 5.0 than the all-SINCGARS architecture score of 3.0.
2. Network Maintenance
a. Definition
The Net Maintenance MOE is the measure of the administrative
traffic that is required to retain network connectivity after the net has been
established. Examples of administrative traffic are radio checks, frequency
changes, and net procedural traffic.
b. Variables Affecting the Net Maintenance MOE
The tactical and environmental situation, the probability that
COMSEC and frequency-hopping operational variables will be lost, and the
degree of confidence that the NCS has in the equipment and its operators are
all variables that affect the amount of time an NCS must dedicate to
maintaining a given net.
To compare alternative radio configurations, this thesis will
only consider the loss of essential radio variables to assess Net Maintenance.
It is recognized that the tactical situation and environmental factors can
change the degree of net maintenance, however the change will be primarily
relative to the situation, and not to the radio configuration employed.
Similarly, the variable of confidence is likely to change from unit to unit, so it
is not considered in developing this MOE. (Here we could incorporate a factor
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that distinguishes the greater training and availability c ' knowledgeable
operators at higher unit levels)
c. Baseline Criteria
The net operation of the AN/VRC-12 series radio is used as the
baseline criteria from which to make qualitative assessments of utility
rankings for alternative radio configurations.
d. Alternative Radio Assessments
Since the AN/VRC-12 series radio and SINCGARS radio will
use similar COMSEC devices, the loss of this equipment variable is not
addressed. Everything else remaining equal, the SINCGARS frequency-
hopping radio has five additional equipment variables required to insure
proper operation in the frequency-hopping mode. These additional variables
were described in section C of Chapter n.
Below are the results of the Maturity Operational Test and
Operational Assessment (O/A) showing the average number of times that a
radio experienced the loss of one or all of the frequency-hopping variables
[Ref. 10: p. 1].
PROBLEM MOT RESULTS O/A RESULTS
Loss of variables 21 /week/radio 1.4/week/radio
When these SINCGARS variables are lost for whatever reason,
the recovery process is quite time consuming and can take from thirty to fifty
steps to reload the lost variables [Ref.l0:p. 13]. Since radios using the fixed-
frequency mode of operation do not require these five variables, performance
in terms of increased administrative time is reduced. Therefore, the Net
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Maintenance MOE receives a marginally acceptable criteria score of 4 for
alternatives employing frequency-hopping operation. The criteria score for
the mixed radio configuration is determined by a percentage of SEMCGARS
and fixed frequency nets in the given architecture as demonstrated
previously.
DESCRIPTION SCORE
Conventional Single-Channel FM w/COMSEC 5
SINCGARS-V w/imbedded COMSEC, Frequency Hopping 4
Mixed SINCGARS and Conventional FM Environment 4-5
3. Information Protection (IP)
a, Definition
The Information Protection MOE is defined as the effectiveness
of the design parameters that have been built into the network's radio
equipment that allows it to conceal transmitted information from
unauthorized users. It is a measure of the architecture's electronic counter-
countermeasure (ECCM) ability.
This MOE is often used with an ECCM encryption MOE which
would be assessed by comparing information scrambling (COMSEC)
techniques and devices.
b. Variables Affecting Information Protection MOE
The design parameters of antennas, the power output control
parameters, and the frequency modulation/spread spectrum techniques
employed by the radio technology are the variables used to develop a
Information Protection (IP) MOE assessment.
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All of these design parameter variables can be used to conceal
the transmitted information from unauthorized users. Directional antennas
transmit a signal in only one limited sector forward of friendly position, thus
reducing the chance of detection by the enemy. Power output, when reduced
to the minimum strength necessary to establish a link, will also reduce the
probability of being detected by the enemy because the transmission range is
reduced.
The most important variable required to assess the IP MOE is the
frequency-hopping capability of the new radio systems. The information
transmitted over a frequency-hopping radio (when hopping more than 200
hops per second) cannot be captured by unauthorized users unless they know
the exact hopping pattern and hopping rate, and can synchronize equipment
to receive these transmitted signals.
c. Baseline Criteria
The conventional single-channel FM radio configuration is used
as a baseline measurement.
d. Alternative Radio Assessments
Alternative one has a criteria score of five as the baseline. The
AN/VRC-12 series radios can transmit on a low power setting of 3-5 watts,
and are capable of using directional long wire antennas cut to the desired
frequency.
DESCRIPTION SCORE
Conventional Single-Channel FM w/CRYPTO 5
SINCGARS-V w/imbedded CRYPTO, Frequency Hopping 9
Mixed SINCGARS and Conventional FM Environment 5-9
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SINCGARS operating in the fixed-frequency mode would have a
slight advantage over the conventional system in that power output can be
adjusted down to four watts. This feature allows the SINCGARS fixed-
frequency user to have more flexibility in providing protection for his
transmitted message.
The frequency-hopping capability of the SINCGARS radio
provides state-of -the-art protection against unauthorized users intercepting a
transmitted message. This alternative did not receive a utility rating of 10 for
the IP MOE because the efficiency of directional antennas is decreased in the
frequency-hopping mode of operation. Antennas are adjusted for one specific
frequency. They cannot provide maximum efficiency for frequency-hopping
radios which transmit multiple frequencies over one channel. The criteria
score for the mixed environment is determined by the percentage of
SINCGARS radios and conventional AN/VRC-12 series radios assigned to
the same unit. For example, if 60 percent of a force's radios were conventional
fixed-frequency and the other 40 percent were SINCGARS, then the resulting
force IP MOE would be: (.60)*5 + (.40)*9 = 6.6.
4. Radio Reliability (R)
a. Definition
Though we initially intended to develop a measure of overall
system reliability (an additional MOE that could be used to discriminate
between architectures) time prevented us from including that in the current
version of MCCAAM. Instead of calculating some measure of overall system
reliability, we simply collect the number of radio failures for each type of
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radio in a given architecture. The total failures for an architecture give some
indication of reliability at the component level.
MCCAAM collects radio failure statistics on all the individual
radio objects (AN/VRC-12 family or SINCGARS) throughout the simulation
run. Assumptions in the collection of this data include:
• Radio equipment configurations and operations are in accordance with
published operating instructions.
• All the radios of same type have the same MTBF.
b. Variables Affecting the Reliability MOE
The assumptions made in modelling radio reliability (i.e.
exponential, no wear-out lifetimes) preclude anything within the current
model environment from really affecting the reliability measure. We
understand that we are simply sampling failure times from an exponential
distribution and then collecting those failures. The only factor influencing
the number of failures within a simulation run is the user defined MTBF
values for the various radio types.
c. Alternative Radio Assessments
Recent upgrades and redesign have greatly increased the MTBF
factor for the SINCGARS from an initial value of 1250 hours. For example, a
1988 follow-on operational test and evaluation (FOT&E) demonstrated an
MTBF exceeding 5,000 hours for 100 radios in operation for over 20,000
operating hours [Ref. 37]. More recently, preliminary reports from the Gulf
War proclaim SINCGARS MTBFs were around the 7,000 hour mark,-whereas
the VRC-12 family of radios experienced an MTBF average range of 250 - 300
hours. Using the definitions and equations outlined above, MCCAAM
allows an assessment of radio reliability for any given mixed radio
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environment by randomly generating reliability failures and repairs from
exponential distributions with appropriate means from recent test results and
then aggregating the results for all the radios in the system.
5. Grade of Service (GOS)
a. Definition
The probability that a message that is transmitted from an FM
communications station is received by the intended recipient. This will be
assessed quantitatively in MCCAAM by tracking the number of message
transmission attempts and completions by each radio. The percent
transmissions completed will reflect this measure.
GOS = (# messages completed/# messages attempted) * 100.0
As in all aspects of modelling a complex system, definitions are
key to implementation of a process. For collecting statistics from the myriad
of radios in a MCCAAM run, the following definitions were used:
• Attempt: any time that a radio tries to perform the acknowledgement
and transmission sequence with another radio.
• Success: an attempt that culminates in the information transferred to
the intended receiver radio (note distinction between intended receiver
and destination of message for the case where a message is routed
through an alternate net)
Thus, a radio which attempts to transmit a MEO to two receivers
in which
• receiver 1 acknowledges contact, receives full transmission, and
acknowledges receipt would be counted as (1 attempt, 1 success)
• receiver 2 does not acknowledge contact until the transmitter has
pursued the acknowledge process two times and then acknowledges
contact and receives full transmission. This would be counted as (3
attempts, 1 success).
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6. Protection from Jamming (PJ)
a. Definition
Electronic countermeasures (ECM) is defined [7] as those actions
taken to reduce effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum. These actions
include jamming, electronic deception, and emitter direction finding.
Of the three major areas mentioned above, only jamming will
be considered in the evaluation of the jamming protection MOE. The
vulnerability of a given radio configuration to direction finding (DF) can be
represented by an equation taking into account such factors as power output,
transmitter and receiver antenna gain, thermal noise, environmental noise,
and path loss of the signal, but these factors are not currently incorporated
into MCCAAM. [Ref. 10]
b. Variables Affecting the Protection from Jamming MOE
An equation that represents how well a given architecture




PJ = Assessment of architecture's resistance to jamming
GOSj = Average link grade of service during jamming
GOS = Average link grade of service before jamming
c. Alternative Radio Assessments
MCCAAM is used to measure the effects of jamming by running
a given scenario and collecting required data to calculate the grade of service
(GOS) for that architecture. A user specified level of jamming is then
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introduced and the simulation is run again with the same traffic workload
sample path. The grade of service is calculated and the difference is attributed
to the jamming effect on the communications architecture.
7. Timeliness (T)
a. Definition
Timeliness is described by the average amount of time a message
has to wait for delivery by a given architecture. We calculate average message
wait time as the difference in message delivery time and message duration.
W = average message wait time
W = Message Delivery Time-Message Duration
W = (Msg Stop Time-Msg Start Time)-Msg Duration
We define the message delivery time as beginning when a
message is pulled out of its radio queue and a transmission is attempted. The
completion time is defined when a message is successfully received by its
intended receiver. So, for a single simulation run, each radio will have its
own average message delivery time. By defining timeliness in this manner,
we take into account the fact that different radios will be processing different
BOSTS with different message durations.
After we calculate each radio's average message wait time, we
sum over each type of radio to obtain an average message wait time by radio
type. We then aggregate to the architecture level and obtain an overall
average message wait time.
Since an architecture's average message wait time will depend
greatly on the amount of traffic it handles, we need to scale the average
message wait time by the number of messages successfully transmitted.
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W* = Adjusted W = W/# Messages
Our Timeliness MOE is then defined as one over the adjusted wait time. This
convention makes the larger valued MOE more desirable.
T = 1/W*
b. Variables Affecting Timeliness
Any network subjected to any type of stresses at all will not be
able to process traffic in a perfectly timely manner. In MCCAAM, the stresses
of jamming, radio failures, and heavy contention for a given net all
contribute to a message not being transmitted in exactly its message duration
time. For example, suppose a battalion Fire Support Coordination Net radio
pulls its top priority message out of its queue and attempts to transmit it to a
jammed intended receiver. That message's delivery time will incorporate all
the waiting, re-trials, and possible re-routing time that is necessary to get the
message to the intended receiver.
c. Alternative Radio Assessments
The average message delivery time is collected by radio type, so
comparisons between radio types within a given architecture are available.
Since the SINCGARS radios have a smaller MTBF and are essentially jam-
proof, the average message delivery time will be lower for a SINCGARS radio
when compared to a PRC-77 radio in the same communications
environment. Because some messages have much longer transmission times
than others, a SINCGARS radio might have a longer average message time
than a PRC-77 if it processed many BOSTS with longer than average message
lengths. For this reason, the message durations were all set to an arbitrary
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four minutes in duration for our comparative analysis. As a result of this
control over the simulation, we can confidently attribute any variations in
average message time to different radio types.
E AGGREGATION APPROACH
The common problem is this: given a set of MOEs mi, m2, n\3, ..., mn we
wish to combine them into an overall MOE, E. There are traditionally two
approaches to this problem [26]:
• Define E by some mathematical function
• Develop the relationship of E and m-\, m2, nvj, ..., mn using expert
judgment
When the first approach is used, the most common method is to assume
a linear combination:
E = wjmi + W21T12 + W3m3 + ... + Wnmn
where the w's are relative measure weights which reflect the amount of
importance attributed to each measure by the user or modeler. The positive
features of this approach are:
• Simple, easier to sell than other approaches.
• No data needed to build the relationships except the weights.
and the negative features are [26]:
• It is an arithmetic average of the measures and hard to justify the
averaging idea.
• Substitutability (often unwanted) exists in that while relationships
should evaluate tradeoffs, the trade-off should be designed in and not
there as a whim of the function.
• This approach does not provide diminishing marginal return (second
derivative < 0)
• Unresolved dimensionality problems almost always exist ... i.e.
combining time, number of messages, penalty rates, etc.
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• No consideration of variance (or recognition of uncertainty) in the
measuring process.
• This approach gives E by definition and is not an approximation to a
real world number; therefore, we cannot test it.
• Assumes the MOEs are mutually exclusive in what they measure!
To avoid some of the pitfalls described above, we have decided to use a
variation of the linear combination approach where E is defined as the
weighted linear combination of the utilities of the given measures, where
the utilities are measured on a 0-1 scale.
This approach handles the diminishing marginal return problem and
this, in turn, helps a bit with the basic substitutionality problem. It also
alleviates the dimension problem, but it is still an average and there is still no
consideration of variance on the weights assigned.
For such a small number of MOEs, we have elicited the weights to be
used in the aggregation from select experts by having them use a commercial
software product, Expert Choice [Ref. 39], to make paired comparisons of the
MOEs (each MOE is compared against every other). The Analytical Hierarchy
Process (AHP) used by Expert Choice is a well known procedure which
derives relative scales using judgments from experts in the form of these
paired comparisons. AHP background and examples can be found in [38].
The first step in using Expert Choice is the structuring of the problem as a
hierarchy of nodes or leaves. Figure 17 illustrates our problem levels. The
first (or top) level is the overall goal. In our case, it is the selection of the best
communications architecture. In the second level we have three categories
which contribute to the goal. Each of the three categories has two or more
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MOEs, or criteria, beneath them to form level three. The second step is where
each expert is asked to make decisions about the relative importance of each
MOE (as compared to each other MOE) with respect to the overall goal of
selecting the best architecture. This judging is conducted in a structured
environment in Expert Choice where the decision maker is presented with a
sequence of all possible MOE pairs.























Figure 17. Problem Hierarchy
Once all possible pair-wise comparisons have been made within each
level, Expert Choice produces the unique MOE weights based on the
comparisons made by the expert. Figure 18 shows one of the many forms out
output that Expert Choice provides in the form of a sorted synthesis of the
leaf nodes with respect to the overall goal of selecting the best architecture.
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The consensus on the order of importance for the seven MOEs and the
accompanying weights assigned are as follows:
MOE
























Leaf Nodes with respect to
INCONSISTENCY INDEX - 0.00
1.000
Figure 18. Sorted Synthesis of Leaf Nodes
1. Utility Theory
„
"If a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he
will be content to begin with doubts he shall end in certainties."
Francis Bacon
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MCCAAM users will most likely be using the simulation model to
help select one alternative out of several. When the alternatives lead to
payoffs that are random, one would like to select the alternative for which
the expected mean value of the payoff is the largest, but many decisions are
too complex to make decisions by comparing payoff averages directly.
Decisions can be simplified though, provided payoffs are measured by
their utilities. Von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944] showed that if a
decision maker is rational2
,
there exists a function U (the decision maker's
utility function) having the property that the best alternative is the one for
which the expected utility is largest. In other words, a rational decision maker
will make decisions as if he were ranking them by expected utility, even if he
never actually makes the computation. Personal preferences enter through
utility functions. Utility functions can be measured, but we will not discuss
methods for eliciting the utility functions of actual, human decision makers
in this thesis. Utility functions will always be assumed to be known,
sometimes with an argument as to plausibility.
If U' = aU + b, then the linearity of the expectation operator implies
that E(U') = aE(U) + b. It follows that E(U') and E(U) rank alternatives in the
same order as long as a>0, and therefore that U' is operationally the same
utility function as U. Therefore the origin and unit of utility can be selected
2
"Rational" means that certain postulates of rationality are satisfied.
Rational decision makers, for example, are assumed to have transitive
preferences: if A is preferred to B and B to C, then A must be preferred to C.
95
for convenience—letting the worst outcome have a utility of and the best a
utility of 1.0 is common.
Figure 19 illustrates the characteristics of the three basic utility
preference curves: risk averse, risk neutral, and risk prone. The real value, or
utility of an additional increment of a measure of effectiveness depends on






Figure 19. Utility Curve Classifications
The risk averse decision maker exhibits a diminishing additional
utility for increasing levels of the item of interest, once beyond a given point.
As an example, the log function, y = log x, is concave downward, consistent
with the idea of diminishing additional utility as one's wealth increases from
each increment of added money. The risk neutral decision maker exhibits a
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linearly increasing utility for increasing levels of the item or quantity of
interest. The risk prone decision maker exhibits a rapidly increasing utility for
increasing levels of the quantity of interest.
To illustrate the use of utilities with respect to our measures of
effectiveness, an example is presented for the qualitatively assessed Network
Construction MOE.
For each net in a given architecture, the criterion scale values defined
by Table 3 are assigned. Next, for each type of net in the architecture the scale
values are summed and then divided by the total number of nets. This gives
the architecture's Network Construction score, which is then applied to the
decision maker's specified utility curve.
Example: Given 200 MEB Single-Channel Nets
140 Conventional * Scale Value of 5 = 700
60 SINCGARS * Scale Value of 3 = 180
880
Dividing the sum of 880 by total number of nets, 200, yields 4.40,
which is this architecture's raw Network Construction score.
Assuming a risk prone utility curve, U(x) = x^, we see (Figure 20) that
the utility of a Network Construction value of 4.4 is 0.194 when the baseline
value of 5.0 would give a utility of 0.25.
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Figure 20. Utility of Network Construction MOE
Clearly, the choice of utility curve as well as the choice of weighting
and criterion scale for the subjective MOEs will have definite impacts on the
calculated utilities. When the same decision environment must be faced on
multiple occasions, ranking outcomes according to expected utility is
definitely a more comfortable idea, but there is no logical requirement for that
to be the case.
The assumption that the seven MOEs are mutually exclusive is one
that could be argued against fairly easily, and if a decision maker doesn't like




A more direct way to measure the overall effectiveness of a given
communications network is through a unique penalty accrual process we
have developed which is directly related to the system's timeliness.
Timeliness, of course, is affected by all the previous MOEs in some manner or
another, and thus is a good natural aggregation measure.
Each BOST which is undertaken has a time within which all of the tasks
associated with it (MEOs) must be completed. As described in Chapter III,
these times are not available from any doctrinal source, so professional best
guess values were specified based on fleet experience in the Marine Corps.
These values are some of the many available for easy manipulation within
MCCAAM. Since these times are common to architectures being compared
in MCCAAM, and no real-world values exist, only their magnitudes relative
to one another are of any importance.
If a given BOST is not completed within its user-defined allotted time, a
one-time penalty is recorded. This penalty's value is determined by the
nature of the BOST and the particular unit that is originating it. Additionally,
some designated BOSTs will continue to accrue additional penalties for each
time unit they proceed beyond their given allotted times. Collectively, these
penalties reflect the system's ability or inability to process traffic in a timely
manner. [Ref. 11]
The stationary mean rate of penalty accrual will reflect the degree to
which the network is functioning properly. If a large amount of penalty is
being accumulated constantly, the BOST deadlines are consistently being
violated. The analyst or model user then identifies the sources of largest
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consistent penalty accrual and determines if the given deadlines are
unrealistic, if certain nets or units are consistently resource constrained, or if
some BOSTs need to be redesigned. By analyzing the penalty choke points,
an analyst might improve the doctrinal structure for a given BOST by
increasing task concurrency or changing traffic routing to ensure more timely
dissemination.
Beyond the stationary mean rate of penalty accrual mentioned above, we
know that to fully stress a given network architecture, we would need to test
many different traffic intensity patterns before we found one to break the
network. By linearly increasing the traffic workload intensity, we can obtain a
measure of effectiveness that is less straightforward than the stationary case
but one that provides some very good insights into network performance.
Recall that in our central traffic generation process described in section C of
Chapter IE, the delays between BOST generations had a mean 2/Ar. We will
call r our workload intensity, and we consider the case r-1 to be our baseline.
As previously discussed, the BOST initiation rates do not come from any
doctrinal or scenario specific source and thus do not reflect an actual system's
fluctuating intensity. Any given real-time communications network's traffic
is going to be highly dependent on the level of unit engagements, movement,
enemy EW action, the time of day, and the terrain and weather. Not wanting
to be tied to a scenario or attrition type model, we allow the traffic intensity to
continuously increase over time to give a picture of network performance
through all ranges of possible stress.
When we use r as our workload intensity variable, we believe that, for
each communications configuration, there exists a threshold workload
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intensity r* such that for r < r*, the penalty accumulating rate, 3p(r)/3r, is
fairly small, and as the workload intensity grows above r*,9p(r)/9r rapidly
becomes much large. Thus a communications network can handle its
workload fairly well until the workload intensity passes r*, at which point
the system breaks and can no longer handle the offered traffic. Analysis of
this increasing workload intensity is not covered in this thesis.
To summarize, our penalty MOE (P) is the sum of all one-time penalties
and accrued penalty rate for a given simulation run. Since the overall
penalty will be a direct function of the number of BOSTS that get processed,
we scale the accumulated penalty by that number of BOSTS. This provides a
more accurate relative measure of an architecture's penalty.
P* - P/# BOSTS
G. SUMMARY
In most simulation programs, model parameters, when related to
physical entities, are as objective and quantified as they would be in an
engineering sense, and can be measured or estimated. When equipment
parameters have not been clearly defined for all ranges of a system or are
unavailable, measures of performance (MOP) for these items are not as easily
measured. In these cases, MOP's are often subjective and qualitative, e.g.,
ordinal ranking by experts, and may or may not be assigned numerical values.
MOEs and MOFEs are heavily judgmental even when they are numerical,
since choosing system boundaries, particular functions to be evaluated, and
the reference standards can greatly influence particular numerical
calculations. When based on models, they are highly dependent on the
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model assumptions, simplifications, values of input parameters, and the
selection of output measures to be estimated. [Ref. 5]
This is one reason MCCAAM can be so effective for studying the large,
complex communications process. If a particular analyst or decision maker
does not think the input parameters are accurate for a given
simulation/analysis scenario, sensitivity analysis can easily give insight into
the effects of changing assumptions or values of those input parameters. An
example of the possibilities afforded in this area with MCCAAM is presented




Because simulation involves statistical sampling from waiting time
distributions, repetition of a simulation under a fixed set of factor
conditions produces variable results. Thus we have a situation in which
(1) we have a large number of variables to consider and (2) the variation
cannot be ignored. This is exactly the situation for which experimental
designs were invented. [Ref. 30]
Even a well documented model may generate non-credible results
without an appropriate experimental design which can establish the
statistical validity of the model under varying environments. [Ref. 18]
Since we want to investigate how the various parameters and particular
structural assumptions of MCCAAM affect its measures of performance, we
need a structured experimental environment to conduct intelligent analyses.
In the simulation context, experimental design provides a means to
decide beforehand which system parameters to use or change so the desired
information can be obtained. As we learn more about the behavior of a model
(in particular, which factors really matter and how they appear to be affecting
the response), we may want to move on and become more specific with our
goals. [Ref. 30]
To begin our experimental analysis, it is necessary to define the type of
simulation we are going to run.
B. TERMINATING OR STEADY-STATE ?
'The two types of simulations with regard to analysis of output data are
terminating and steady-state simulations." [Ref. 34] We begin this section by
defining what we mean by these two terms.
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• "A terminating simulation is one for which the desired measures of
system performance are defined relative to the interval of simulated
time [0, T], where T is the instant in the simulation when some
specified event, E, occurs. (Note that T may be a random variable.)
Since measures of performance for terminating simulations explicitly
depend on the state of the simulated system at time 0, care must be
taken in choosing initial conditions." [Ref. 34]
• "A steady-state simulation is one for which the measures of
performance are defined as limits as the length of the simulation goes
to infinity. Since there is no natural event E to terminate the
simulation, the length of one simulation is made large enough to get
"good" estimates of the quantities of interest. Steady-state does not
mean that the actual delays in a single realization (or run) of the
simulation become constant after some point in time, but that the
distribution of the delays becomes invariant" [Ref. 34]
From the definitions above, it is clear that for some systems either type of
simulation might be appropriate, depending on what the analyst wants to
learn about the system. For example, in a complex communications model
like MCCAAM, a steady-state simulation might be designed to estimate the
penalty accrual rate after the user-defined MAGTF has been operating long
enough for the exercise/battle to have progressed through all possible phases
of operation. Another application could be to estimate the steady-state
expected average message completion time for an architecture if the MAGTF
was to operate at a high traffic intensity for an indefinite period of time.
To use MCCAAM as a terminating simulation tool, consider the analyst
who wants to look at starting a network cold and then study the measures of
effectiveness after one twenty-four hour period of normal activity. The
initial conditions in this case, empty and idle, would provide a realistic
assessment of the normal beginning of an operation when all concerned
units are just establishing communications.
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Another terminating application could be the analysis of a short war
where the traffic intensity was a non-homogeneous Poisson process. Creating
cycles of high intensity traffic in the early morning and late evening hours for
each twenty-four hour period would provide a realistic traffic environment,
where most intense conflicts might take place outside of the middle of the
day. The end of the three days would terminate the simulation and the
resulting MCCAAM penalty statistics and other measures of effectiveness
could provide comparative insight when examined against a competing
architecture pushed through the same simulation environment. Scripted
message traffic from an actual exercise would provide a great example of this
type of terminating analysis.
A major consideration in how we approached our analysis was the need
to eliminate as much unwanted variability as possible in our model.
Variability that just adds fog to a model, without affecting any measures of
effectiveness in a significant way, makes any analysis task more difficult. A
short run, terminating simulation would have added more traffic variability
that would have detracted from our comparative analysis. Since we were not
given a specific scenario to model and the goal of the study focused on the
long-term effects of architecture differences, we made the decision to look at
our system measures from a steady-state perspective. This decision was
embraced by our Marine Corps sponsors.
C MODEL SPECIFICS
1. Simulation Time
Since a steady-state simulation approach was taken for this example
analysis, we are interested in examining the expected average MOE values
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after one simulation run of sufficient duration to ensure good estimates. The
length of sufficient duration that is needed is dependent on how long the
simulated system takes to reach steady-state conditions. The time our
communication system takes to reach steady-state conditions is calculated by
means of the penalty output analysis described by Bailey in [Ref. 25]. To
summarize this method, we examine sequential time samples of the penalty
accumulation rate at fixed intervals (starting from the end of the simulation,
when the system is in steady-state) and compute F statistics to determine
when the distribution changes a statistically significant amount. Since the
time samples are taken from the end of the simulation run, the point at
which the F statistic allows us to reject the null hypothesis, (the penalty rate
samples are from the same distribution), we can mark that time as the end of
the initial transient conditions and the beginning of steady-state. This
method is further detailed in [40].
Using the above approach, we found that for the level of traffic
intensity we were modelling (see Appendix I for Traffic Data) the simulation
entered its steady-state range very quickly (approximately 2,000 minutes).
Since we knew we would need to drop the output from the first 2,000
minutes and still want a good sample of steady-state output, we conducted
our production runs for a 10,000 minute duration (approximately 7 days).
Because we are unable to start the simulation off at time in a state
which is representative of the steady-state behavior of the architecture, the
output data at the beginning of the simulation are not good estimates of the
steady-state MOE responses we are interested in. Since the penalty rate for
each architecture was the only MOE to be statistically analyzed with a steady-
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state approach, the initial transient problem was dealt with by dropping the
first 2000 minutes worth of penalty rate output data. [Ref. 34:p. 307]
2. Units and Nets
Figure 21 on the following page shows the sub-network of the MEB
communications architecture that we are using for this analysis example. As
the figure details, we are simulating only the major Fire Support nets of the
Ground Combat Element of the MEB. The sub-network involves the Brigade
Operations Center, the Regimental Operations Center, the three infantry
battalions (each with three companies and one 81 mm Mortar Platoon), and
the Artillery Battalion with its three Artillery Batteries. The fourth artillery
battery, N5/11, is a self-propelled artillery battery that has been attached to the
Regiment to help support the mechanized battalion in its maneuver
operations. There are a total of 22 units or command and control facilities
(C2FACs) using a total of 19 different communications nets with 102 radios.
Each link between the units in Figure 21 actually represents all the different
nets that currently connect two given units. For example, the line connecting
the 3d Marine Regiment to the 1/12 Arty Battalion actually represents
connectivity between these two units on an Intelligence Net, a Fire Support
Control Net, a Conduct of Fire Net, and a Regimental Tactical Net.
3. Radios and Jammers
For the architecture illustrated on the next page, the 22 units own a
total of 102 radios which can be designated as PRC-77, SINCGARS, or HF types
in the data base manipulation program. Providing the essential threat stress,
we model two jammers which are located within range of all the units
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modelled in this sub-network. All the jammer specific data for our analysis




















































Figure 21. 1st MEB Fire Support Architecture
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4. Analysis Set-Up
As an example of how MCCAAM can be used by Marine Corps
analysts, the simulation experiment in this thesis compares four different
SINCGARS allocation schemes for the Fire Support nets of a standard Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) architecture. The object of this experiment is to
determine whether there is any difference between the communication
abilities of this portion of the MEB for the different allocations, to estimate
the differences, and to assess the precision of the estimates. A short
description of each of the allocation schemes follows:
• Allocation Scheme 1 is the standard benchmark for the analysis. It
represents the way the Marine Corps MEBs currently communicate.
All the MEB units are using only the fixed-frequency VRC-12 and PRC-
77 family of radios.
• Allocation Scheme 2 represents the philosophy that the higher level
nets are carrying more important information and therefore need the
protection that SINCGARS provides. Therefore, under this scheme,
SINCGARS are issued to the high level nets first and then down the
architecture until depleted.
• Allocation Scheme 3 is for those who would propose that the new,
highly reliable anti-jam radios need to go to the units who operate in
the field the most. Those tactical units which, in combat, will be
actively engaged with the enemy the greatest amount of time. So, for a
given number of SINCGARS, the subscribers on the nets at the lowest
level are issued SINCGARS until the number of available radios is
depleted.
• Allocation Scheme 4 assigns the available SINCGARS radios to the
nets that are used the most with the current traffic workload. This
allocation obviously does not protect the most "important" traffic, but
it provides yet another example for comparison, and is a potential
consideration for decision makers.
The flow for each allocation scheme in Figure 22 below illustrates a
simulation run in MCCAAM with the same workload sample path and
jammer interaction. The output for each iteration or run are the statistics
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used for calculating the seven communication MOEs and the accrued penalty,
P. For each allocation scheme, the seven MOE values are calculated or taken
straight from the output files as described in Chapter IV. Next, the utilities of
each of the MOE values is calculated with user-defined utility curves. Using
weights obtained from a pair-wise comparison of all the MOEs as described in
Chapter IV, we then aggregate the seven MOEs to obtain, E, an aggregate
measure of that architecture's communications performance.
AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4
Baseline Allocate Allocate Allocate
All PRC-77 FEBABack Top Down Busiest Nets
( MCCAAM^) (MCCAAM ) ( MCCAAM^) ( MCCAAM )
© © © © ©© © ©
Figure 22. Experimental Flow
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We would like to see that both aggregate measures of effectiveness
choose the same architecture as "the best", but the aggregation of the seven
individual measures considers effects of more factors than does the overall
penalty MOE and might yield different results in certain circumstances.
Once we have obtained all the measures of effectiveness for each of
the four allocation schemes, we are interested in choosing the architecture
that gives us the best measures of effectiveness in the most areas.
The next chapter provides model results and an example of how an




Four example architectures were developed to demonstrate the utility of
MCCAAM as both an analytic and planning tool. The baseline, model as
described in the previous chapter, provides a point of reference for
comparison of experimental results. The three additional scenarios
demonstrate the use of MCCAAM as a planning tool and allow the user to
compare results of alternative tactical plans with those of the baseline model.
A. MODEL VERIFICATION
Before describing the steps taken in verifying MCCAAM, we begin by
giving some simple definitions of verification, validation, and output
analysis to avoid any confusion over what is being referred to. "Verification is
determining whether a simulation model performs as intended, i.e. properly
debugging the program." [Ref. 34] Although simple in concept, this was very
difficult for a large-scale simulation model like MCCAAM. "Validation is
determining whether a simulation model (as opposed to the computer
program) is an accurate representation of the real-world system under study.
This is to be contrasted with output analysis which is concerned with
determining a simulation model's (not necessarily the system's) true
parameters or characteristics." [Ref. 34:p. 333]
Our model verification goal was to confirm that MCCAAM was producing
the numbers that we desired when we implemented our model logic. This
was accomplished in large part by five techniques [Ref. 34] briefly described
below :
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Technique 1: In developing MCCAAM, we wrote and debugged the
entire program in modules. The modular structure of MODSIM II
made this very easy and natural and greatly assisted in testing
subprogram structures. As the program coding progressed, additional
levels of detail were successively added until the model satisfactorily
represented our system of interest.
Technique 2: Realizing it is advisable to have more than one person
"proof" the computer program when large simulation models are
being developed, we implemented this formally with periodic
structured walk-throughs. These walk-throughs allowed the three
members of the modelling team to work through modules step-by-step
to reach mutual agreement on logic and implementation style.
Technique 3: One of the more powerful verification techniques that
can be used to debug a discrete-event simulation model is a trace. Once
again, MODSIM made this very easy with its built-in trace stream
objects. Appendix H shows one page of our c31og.out file which
contains examples of statements that were written to the file
throughout the flow of the program to ensure the system was behaving
the way we intended it to. This trace stream was very effective in
revealing areas of faulty code or problem areas. Through appropriately
located comments, we could pin-point the models activities in any
given area and time of interest.
Technique 4: By running MCCAAM under a set of simplifying
assumptions (manifest by changing input parameters) for which the
model's true characteristics were known (or easily calculated), we were
able to assure ourselves that from the simple level on up, the radios,
nets, and messages were all behaving as intended and expected.
Technique 5: Not always the easiest to incorporate, technique five
involves displaying simulation output on the terminal screen as the
simulation actually progresses. Though not necessarily helpful with
all types of simulations, this technique was employed in MCCAAM
through the graphical portrayal of the accumulating penalty for the
architecture under study. Through this window, which is active while
the simulation program is running, we see the the passage of time and
the architecture's accumulating penalty. Graphical portrayal of any of
MCCAAM's measures of effectiveness can be implemented to provide
the analyst a real-time picture of the system's performance.
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B. RESULTS
Once the verification steps discussed above were completed with our final
version of MCCAAM, we were able to make production runs for analysis
purposes. The paragraphs below list the quantifiable measures of
effectiveness we obtained through MCCAAM. The measures determined
through the subjective scoring (not obtained through MCCAAM) are also
















Average message wait time (minutes)
Number of messages completed in simulation time.
Timeliness measure = l/(W/#Mess)
Grade of Service = #Messages Comp/#Messages Art
Protection from Jamming = GOSj/GOS
Radio Reliability = Number of radio failures3
Information Protection (calculated from criterion scale)
Network Construction (calculated from criterion scale)
Network Maintenance (calculated from criterion scale)
Sum of weighted utilities of MOEs
Overall penalty accumulated by given architecture
Number of BOSTS completed in simulation time.
Scaled Penalty MOE = P/#Bosts
Average Penalty Rate for entire simulation run.
The respective weights and utilities below are examples of values that
were obtained for each of our seven measures of effectiveness as described in
Chapter IV. The weights came from the paired comparisons of all MOEs
using Expert Choice and the utility curves for each of the MOEs are just some
3 The radio failure numbers in Table 4 are intentionally very large. The
MTBF values we used were much smaller than currently known values in
order to see effects of high radio failure. Additionally, the statistic reflects all
the radios in the MEB whether they were used or not. Since it is simply a
relative term between allocation schemes, the magnitude is not important.
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of many that could be employed. The specific utility values listed were
obtained by substituting Allocation Scheme 1 MOE values into the respective
utility functions.
• Weight (GOS) = .299 Utility (GOS) = GOS A 2 = 0.871
• Weight (PJ) = .191 Utility (PJ) =PJA 2 = 0.912
• Weight (T) = .176 Utility(T) = 2*HN = 0.334
• Weight (R) = .141 Utility(R) = R/1000 = 0.173
• Weight (NM) = .084 Utility (NM)= NM/1000 = 0.395
• Weight (IP) = .064 Utility (IP) = IP/1000 = 0.395
• Weight (NC) = .045 Utility (NC) =NC/1000 = 0.395
The aggregate measure E is calculated as the weighted sum of utilities as
described in Chapter IV:
E = Xwi*Ui
E = .299*U(GOS) + .191*U(PJ) + .176*U(T) + .141*U(R)
+ .084*U(NM) + .064*U(IP) + .045*U(NC)
E = 0.5361
Table 4 summarizes all the individual and collective measures for the
four allocation schemes. Our experimental results show that Allocation
Scheme 3 (FEBA back) produces the overall best communications architecture
with respect to the overall accumulated penalty. Allocation Scheme 4 appears
to be the best architecture with respect to most of the individual MOEs and
the aggregate MOE, E.
An analyst could now use these results to brief a decision maker with
quantifiable results. One question remains: Are these differences in
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architectures statistically significant? The following sections discuss how we
can formally look at the differences in some of the MOEs obtained.
TABLE 4. MOE RESULTS
MOE AS1 AS2 AS 3 AS4 BEST
W 35.91 44.64 38.24 38.88 AS1
#Mess 5414 6387 6141 6453 AS4
T 150.83 143.20 160.59 165.98 AS4
GOS 93.36 96.83 95.89 97.83 AS4
PJ 0.955 0.980 0.975 0.976 AS2
R 1733 1372 1399 1425 AS2
IP 5 6.97 6.97 7.03 AS4
NC 5 4.01 4.01 3.99 AS1
NM 5 4.51 4.51 4.49 AS1
E .5361 .5569 .5595 .5669 AS4
P 50331 51,517 48,530 53,006 AS3
# Bosts 203 231 237 248 AS4
P* 247.94 223.02 204.78 213.73 AS3
PRate 4.67 4.92 4.71 5.24 AS1
C SELECTION PROCEDURES
The different MOEs provided in any MCCAAM run give any analyst or
decision maker the ability to select a best architecture in one of any number of
different areas. For example, if an analyst was only interested in how many
BOSTS an architecture could process in a heavy jamming environment, then
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he could make his selection based strictly on the Protection from Jamming
(PJ) MOE.
If there is no clear difference in the performance of competing
architectures when examining all the tabulated measures of effectiveness,
then there is no reason to pursue further analysis. On the other hand, if there
seems to be a difference in the performance of competing architectures, we
want to provide a decision maker with some sense of how much
performance difference exists.
The following sections discuss statistical approaches to help assess those
performance differences.
D. ANALYSIS OF DESIGN AND MOES
A natural first step is to compare all the architectures or systems to a
standard or reference point to discern the magnitude of performance
differences. Beyond comparison to a reference point, one of the simplest and
most intuitive approaches when comparing two systems is to examine the
difference in the average values of a specific measure of effectiveness. The
most efficient way to look at differences is through a confidence interval
approach, so this technique is presented below.
1. Confidence Intervals for Steady-State Simulations
For our analysis example, we are interested in the penalty rate output
for a single steady-state simulation run. If we let the variables pi, p2, • •, pj
represent this output process and pi represent the architecture's penalty rate
at time i in the simulation run, then we define the steady-state average
response p* of pi (when it exists) by:
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p*= lim ——— w.p. 1
m-»oo m
Of the two general approaches given in most simulation literature for
constructing a confidence interval for p*, we chose the fixed-sample-size
approach. Within the fixed-sample-size approach, there are five or more
techniques available. We chose the batch means technique which partitions
the output data p\, p2, • •, pj into approximately IID observations to which
classical statistical analyses can be applied to construct a confidence interval.
[Ref. 30]
For the batch means technique, we make a simulation run of length
m and then divide the resulting observations (whether they be penalty rate,
grade of service, or number of BOSTS) into n batches of length /. (Assume
that m = nl) Thus, batch 1 contains observations p\, p2, ..., pi etc. If we let
Pj(l) be the batch mean of the / observations in the jth batch and
be the grand sample mean, then we can use P(n,l) as our point estimator for
P*. Thus the P.(/) 's play the same role for batch means as the individual
observations do for the terminating case confidence interval.
If we choose the batch size / large enough, it can be shown that the
*jW 's will be approximately uncorrelated. Additionally, if / is chosen large
enough, there are central limit theorems for correlated stochastic processes
that allow us to assume the P.(/) 's to be approximately normally distributed.
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Ten differences between averages from comparable non-overlapping
sequences of observations will be nearly normally distributed because of
the central limit effect. Furthermore, even though successive individual
batch yields are almost certainly statistically dependent, the differences
between averages will be distributed approximately independently. [Ref.
30: p. 51]
Therefore, if the batch size / is large enough, it follows that it is not
unreasonable to treat the Py(/) 's as if they were IID normal random variables
with mean u. and to construct an approximate 100(l-a) percent confidence
interval for |i from
P(n,l) ± t^MiVs&nyn
2





Using the approach above, we ran MCCAAM for 10,000 minutes,
deleted the first 2000 minutes worth of penalty output, and then collected 31
batches of size 5 by sampling from the penalty process every 50 minutes. For
each of the four allocation schemes, the global penalty rate batch means,
standard deviations of the means, and associated 95% confidence intervals
are listed below:
AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4
Batch Mean* 4.67 4.92 4.71 5.24
Stand. Dev. 0.246 0.255 0.273 0.302
Conf. Interval (4.17,5.17) (4.40, 5.44) (4.15, 5.26) (4.62, 5.86)
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2. Multiple Comparisons with a Standard
Using the standard treatment (AS1 : No SINCGARS in architecture)
as a benchmark against which to compare the specific allocation schemes, the
question to be answered is whether or not any of the treatments may be
considered to be different from the mean of the standard.
With k=4 allocation schemes, the statistic of interest is the k-l= 3
differences ASi- ASi where ASi is the observed average response for the
baseline architecture with no SINCGARS. The 1-a confidence intervals for
all 3 differences from the standard are calculated from Dunnett's Procedure
[Ref. 30:p. 205] as given below:
±t„v,a/2 S VnT+nT
where ^,v,o/2 values are found in Dunnett (1964). S is the pooled sample
standard deviation, obtained from the four individual standard deviations
and v is the degrees of freedom of the estimate s^-
Thus for our example with k = 4 allocation schemes and 31 batch




Therefore any observed difference from the standard greater than 0.96 in
absolute value can be considered statistically significant at the a = 0.5 level.
The 3 differences that follow show that none of the average penalty rates is
statistically significant from the standard at the 0.05 level:
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AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4
Avg. P Rate 4.67 4.92 4.71 5.24
Difference * 0.25 0.04 0.57
Though it is good practice to allot more observations to the control
treatment than to each of the other treatments, we have 31 batch means for
all four of the architectures of interest.
3. Comparison of Two Averages
The approach demonstrated here for determining if there is a
significant difference between any two MOEs can be applied to most any of the
statistics collected in MCCAAM to provide further insight into architecture
differences.
In our example, we are interested in providing a decision maker with
some idea as to the magnitude of the performance difference between the top
two communications architectures. We accomplish this by constructing a
confidence interval for the difference in the mean values of the two MOEs of
interest. This approach provides more information than if we were to simply
conduct a hypothesis test to see whether the observed differences could be
distinguished from zero.
For this example, we use the thirty-one penalty rate batch means
discussed above as our sample of IID observations from AS3 and AS4. For
example, for allocation scheme four, we will denote the individual batch
means as X4i, X42, X43, ..., X431. We are interested in H = E(XIj), the global
penalty rate batch mean for the entire simulation run for each of the two
allocation schemes. We want to construct a confidence interval for D =
H(AS4) - |i(AS3). By pairing each of the 31 batch means from the two
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allocation schemes, we define Zj = X4j - X3j for j = 1, 2, ..., 31 and we have IID




Z(n> =^ and LVVJ " n(n-l)
and we form the approximate 100(1 -a) percent confidence interval
Z(n) ± tn.i, mx/2 VcT2[z(n)]
If the Zj's are normally distributed, this confidence interval covers D with
probability 1-a; otherwise, we rely on the central limit theorem which
implies that this coverage probability is near 1-a for large n. An important
point here is that we did not have to assume that the allocation batch means
are independent; nor did we have to assume that the variances were equal.
The following paired-t confidence interval is obtained for our example:
Z(n) = 0.536 ^Z(n)] = 51.25/31(30) = 0.055
Va^Zdi)] = o.235
These values give us a 95% confidence interval of
(0.0567, 1.015)
for D = n(AS4) - n.(AS3). So, with approximately 95% confidence, we can say
that u(AS3) differs from (i(AS4), and it appears that AS3 is better with respect
to penalty accrual rate, since it leads to a lower average penalty rate.
122
E VARIANCE REDUCTION
The first (and probably most useful and popular) variance reduction
technique that we considered, common random numbers (CRN), applies
when one is comparing two or more alternative system designs — precisely
the situation in this experiment.
The basic idea with this technique is that we would compare the
alternative systems "under similar experimental conditions" so that we can
be more confident that any observed differences in performance are due to
the differences in the system designs rather than to fluctuations of the
"experimental conditions." In simulations, the experimental conditions are
the generated random variables that are used to drive the models through
simulated time.
The name of this technique stems from the possibility in some situations
of using the same stream of basic U(0,1) random variables to drive each of the
alternative models through time. In the terminology of classical experimental
design, CRN is a form of blocking. This was carried out in MCCAAM by
ensuring each of the radio allocation schemes was exposed to the exact same
traffic workload. No formal analysis is presented to show the effects of
simulating the different architectures with different variable traffic
workloads.
F. MODEL VALIDATION
Though not fully accomplished with MCCAAM, the three-step approach
to validation presented here is an approved approach [Ref. 34] which has
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been carried out to some degree. The remaining validation steps await time
and future testing.
1. Develop a Model with High Face Validity
As an initial objective, we determined to develop a model which, on
the surface, seemed reasonable to Marines knowledgeable about the
communication system being modeled. We tried to make use of all existing
information, which included the following:
Intuition
General Knowledge
Observations of the system
Existing theory
Conversations with experts
2. Test the Assumptions of the Model Empirically
The goal of this step is to quantitatively test the assumptions made
during the initial stages of model development. One of the most useful tools
during the second validation step is sensitivity analysis. This technique was
used to determine how much MCCAAM output varied with small changes
in specific parameters. Another important use of sensitivity analysis is to
determine the level of detail at which a particular sub-system is to be
modelled.
3. Determine How Representative the Simulation Output Are
Probably the most definitive test of the validity of a simulation model is
to establish that the model output data closely resemble the output data
that would be expected from the actual system. [Ref. 34]
If there was specific enough communications data available from a
MEB field exercise, there are a number of statistical tests available in
validation literature for comparing output data from MCCAAM to the MEB
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exercise data. Since the output processes of almost all real-world systems and
simulations are non-stationary (the distributions of the successive
observations change over time) and auto-correlated (the observations in the
process are correlated with each other) the comparison would be difficult
without a model like MCCAAM. Using the exercise's scripted message traffic
to drive the simulation, model output could be used for validation tests.
Since MCCAAM is only an approximation to the actual
communication architecture, a null hypothesis that the system and model are
the same is clearly false. We believe, along with Law and Kelton "that it is
more useful to ask whether or not the differences between the system and the
model are significant enough to affect any conclusions derived from the
model/' [Ref. 34]
In addition to statistical procedures, one can use a Turing test [Ref.
34:p. 341] to compare the output data from a specific field exercise to that of a
MCCAAM simulation of that exercise scenario. In a Turing test, Marines
knowledgeable about the exercise and the communications involved would
be asked to examine one or more sets of exercise data and one or more sets of
MCCAAM results without knowing which data was which. If these "experts"
can differentiate between the exercise data and the MCCAAM data, their
explanation of how they were able to do it can be used to improve the model.
[Ref. 34]
MCCAAM output data could be compared to communications data
from a major field exercise if the particular data needed for validation was
collected and made available. An immediate recommendation is to establish
a MCCAAM simulation of a joint Army/Marine Corps field exercise at Fort
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Irwin, California and take advantage of the Army's extensive data collection
effort at their National Training Center (NTC) to compare the exercise results
to the MCCAAM results. This type of validation effort would go a long way
toward establishing the benefits of a communications analysis model and also
provide great insight into other areas of MCCAAM development.
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS
A. MODEL AND ANALYSIS SUMMARY
In this study, we have proposed a new paradigm for workload modeling
in military communications systems which reflects the dynamics and
dependencies of the actual system, while not requiring a complex, high
resolution combat model. This workload model is facilitated by the
MBOT/BOST/MEO structure previously described.
We constructed an object-oriented simulation model of the
communications system which exploits the given Marine Corps message
structure, and we measured the performance of the system through
traditional communication MOEs and a penalty accumulation process. As we
anticipated, both the object-oriented modelling approach and the MODSIM II
language were found to be powerful and easy to use.
We have constructed a reusable tool for analysis of single-channel voice
communications architectures. By using the model in concert with the
database manipulation program as depicted in Figure 23, a communications
analyst is afforded a rare opportunity to [25]:
• observe the effects of doctrinal modifications to routing, net use, or
directed nets,
• improve allocation of advanced technology single channel radios in
the MAGTF,
• determine the overall capacity of an architecture to handle a mixture of
data and voice traffic,
• react to changing environments involving jamming and other threats
within a pristine experimental environment.
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To summarize the results of the limited analysis example, we re-visit the
respective measures of effectiveness for the four different allocation schemes
in Table 5 below.
TABLES. MOE Summary
AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 "Best"
Bosts 203 231 237 248 AS4
E .5361 .5569 .5595 .5669 AS4
P* 247.9 223.0 204.8 213.7 AS3
As discussed in Chapter six, these measures of effectiveness might not
have any significant meaning when an actual architecture of type similar to
the model is observed in a given field exercise. The strength of these
measures lies in their ability to provide a means for comparative analysis
between two similar systems. Given the control that the simulation model
provides over the communications environment, we can assess differences
in performance between two competing architectures due to the differences in
the architecture composition.
The results from the four different allocation schemes analyzed by
MCCAAM produced distinct measures of effectiveness. The aggregation
approach used in this thesis with accompanying utility curves presents a
MCCAAM user with a flexible, rational means to quantify a given
architecture with a single measure. The unique penalty accrual process was




In order to maintain the best equipped force-in-readiness, the Marine
Corps is pursuing new communications technology at all operational levels.
To best implement the new communications equipment, the Marine Corps
must be able to compare proposed architectures before they are purchased and
fielded. Specifically, the acquisition of the new frequency-hopping
SINCGARS radios over the next few years presents an allocation concern.
It was the purpose of this thesis to design and implement a simulation
model to provide Marine Corps decision makers and communications
officers the ability to quantify the effectiveness of alternate tactical radio
system configurations. We did not attempt to simulate reality but provide
instead an effective comparative analysis tool. In all cases where choices were
made concerning the inclusion of certain aspects of Marine communications,
the question asked was: Does it help to distinguish between different
communications architectures?
Based on the research conducted and the results detailed in this thesis, it
is our conclusion that:
• a comparative analysis tool for Marine Corps communication
architectures is needed.
• optimal allocation of new communications resources is required
• MCCAAM is a viable tool to achieve both.
C RECOMMENDATIONS
As with most modelling and analysis efforts, each problem solved or
question answered usually generates many more to be considered. There still
remains quite a bit of work that can be done to expand MCCAAM's usefulness
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to the Marine Corps. The following paragraphs highlight potential areas of
future work or research.
• MEB Data Base. Our first recommendation is to complete the MEB data
base files to allow for full and accurate analysis of a MEB
communications architecture. This will involve extensive work
inputting message workload data in the form of BOSTs and MEOs, but
will provide an extremely powerful analysis tool.
• Digital Traffic The current form of MCCAAM does not model all the
different complexities of digital transmissions. It treats digital messages
simply as burst transmissions requiring a reduced time to transmit.
The effect on any analysis is to decrease the load on the affected nets
because of the reduced transmission time. We currently have not
provided for different protocols, routing procedures, or even
interoperability considerations of digital message traffic.
Realizing that our tactical communications should support short,
"bursty," critical messages in keeping with the battlefield environment, a very
worthwhile extension of the current study would be to examine the
capabilities of the single channel radio network to concurrently serve as a
voice network and a digital data pipeline below the Infantry Regimental
level. This analysis would require information to include acknowledgement,
re-transmission and relay procedures, assignment of digital devices to units
(C2FACs), designation of specific messages as digital, band-width capabilities
of the pipelines, and limitations imposed by the equipment that is
incorporated. If SINCGARS is not currently a good tool for large data
exchange rates, then it would make sense to allocate the incoming
SINCGARS below regimental level. This study extension has already
received favorable approval from the Marine Corps study sponsors. [Ref. 28]
As another example of future MCCAAM analysis, consider the new
tactical data systems being considered. One such tactical data system, the
Portable Data Link System (PDLS), has been initiated to meet the need that
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exists to provide advance forces and forward aviation command elements
with a compact, rapidly deployable system capable of exploiting established
tactical data information links (TADIL). Once modified, MCCAAM could be
used to measure the effect on force communications if such a data system
was widely adopted. [Ref. 16]
• Spares. Combat is inefficient because of the need for redundancy
(which equates to survivability) in all equipment—especially
communications equipment. If we ignore this need for redundancy in
any equipment allocation scheme, we are not being very realistic.
MCCAAM could be used to great effect in studying the effect of
different types and numbers of backup radio systems at all force levels.
To further expand on the impact of modelling spares, consider the
current model. When a radio fails in MCCAAM, it is not available for
use until its specified repair time has elapsed. The net it was a
subscriber of is totally unavailable to that unit for that period of time.
More realistically, an extra (spare) radio would be brought on-line,
enter the net, and prosecute any waiting messages. In this manner, the
modelling of spares will reduce the penalty associated with not passing
traffic in a timely manner.
• Experimental Designs. An unlimited number of experimental designs
can now be pursued with MCCAAM to examine questions of interest.
A 2$ design, such as the following, could be used to look at the main
effects of jamming, radio reliability and traffic intensity.
Test# # Jammers MTBF Traff Intense Penalty/MOEs
1 4 200 High
2 8 200 High
3 4 400 High
4 8 400 High
5 4 200 Low
6 8 200 Low
7 4 400 Low
8 8 400 Low
Scenarios. Different, specific scenarios could be analyzed to show
effects of force size and threat on communications effectiveness. Data
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obtained from major field exercises could be used to continue
MCCAAM's validation as an effective analysis tool.
• Movement. Integrating unit movement algorithms would create a
greater need for network construction and maintenance modelling for
a given architecture. This would help differentiate between systems
that have distinctly different time costs associated with net
construction and maintenance.
• Graphics. Integrating more simulation graphics will assist users in
tracking communications performance as the simulation progresses.
For example, a net analysis window that reflected all the major nets'
traffic volume and average priority of traffic could help shed some
light on how individual nets are used over time. Further
implementation of graphics in the analysis stage of MCCAAM will
also greatly enhance its ready use.
• Band-width. MCCAAM could, with modifications, be used to assist in
determining effects of changing band-width and wait time parameters
for different communications channels.
• Data problem. During the entire modelling and analysis process, we
noted the recurring need for data like that contained in the LFICS
Scenario and Events Listing (ratio of different precedence traffic,
average number of BOSTS for different types of units, mean time to
establish various types of nets, etc.) Numerous Marine Corps analysis
activities at the Research and Development center such as Wargaming,
C4I Interoperability and Proponency, and the Communications School
currently rely on independently gathered data for respective studies
and analysis pertaining to communications equipment and doctrine. It
would be a very valuable asset if summaries of C4I information from
such exercises as Team Spirit, Combined Arms Exercises (CAX's), and
especially Desert Storm could be permanently retained in a central
repository that was accessible to all who would need it. A system
similar to the Marine Corps Lesson Learned System would greatly
facilitate the use of such models as MCCAAM, as the Marine Corps and
the remainder of the U.S. military moves more and more toward
automated, digital communications.
• Electronic Warfare. Much still remains to be accomplished in
enriching the communications and electronic warfare modules. For
instance, the limitations and capabilities of the threat environment
have not been modelled in a detailed manner. The comparative
analysis conducted in this thesis did not require it, but others might.
Additional technical areas of the communication environment could
be incorporated if a specific analysis need warranted it. Such areas of
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directional antennas, antenna height, HF single side-band radio nets,
and various power level effects could all be incorporated.
Amphibious Nets. The modelling of the complex communications
involved in amphibious operations from ship to shore would be a very
involved but worthwhile project.
Hindsight Optimization. An interesting and challenging project would
be to develop algorithms that would allow MCCAAM to assign a set
amount of communications assets to an architecture's units in a step-
wise fashion that would optimize the architectures performance for a
user-specified criteria (timeliness, grade of service, digital throughput,
etc.).
System Reliability. Not specifically addressed in this thesis but a
candidate for future study is the composite probability that all radio sets
are operational at the start of a mission, will continue to perform
without failure during the mission, and in the event that radio sets do
fail during the mission, can be repaired in a specified time. This type of
measure would include not only the reliability of the system, but the
availability and maintainability of radios as well. [Ref.lO:p. VI-18]
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APPENDIX A. MAIN DEFINITION MODULES
This appendix contains all the main definition modules for current
version of MCCAAM. These Definition Modules give a good overview of
how the communications system was modelled by listing each of the object's
fields, methods, and procedures.
DEFINITION MODULE Globals;
FROM RandMod IMPORT RandomObj;
FROM IOMod IMPORT StreamObj;
TYPE
PrecedenceType = (routine, priority, immediate, flash);










































FROM Globals IMPORT UnitLocationRec,
NetDesignationType,
UnitDesignationType;
FROM Radio IMPORT RadioObj;
FROM Bostlnf IMPORT BostlnstanceTxObj,
BostlnstanceRecType,
BoundUnitRecType;
FROM Bost IMPORT MEORecType;
FROM RecLL IMPORT LinkedListOfRecords;
TYPE
EchelonType = (Sldr, Pit, Co, Bn, Rgt, Div, Corps, Army, Country);
CommunicationMethodType = (RadioComm, Messenger);
ReceiptStatusType = (NewMessage, InterruptedMessage);
CommMethArray = ARRAY INTEGER OF CommunicationMethodType;













radio : ARRAY INTEGER OF RadioObj;
netType : ARRAY INTEGER OF NetDesignationType;
ASK METHOD Objlnit;
TELL METHOD ReceiveBostlnstance
(IN IncomingBostPack : BostlnstanceTxObj;
IN IntendedReceiver : INTEGER;
IN SelectedRadio : RadioObj;
IN ReceiptStatus : ReceiptStatusType);
TELL METHOD ExceptionHandlingRoute
(IN IncomingBostPack : BostlnstanceTxObj);
TELL METHOD KnowAboutJamming(IN Radio : RadioObj;








FROM Radio IMPORT RadioObj;




FROM Unit IMPORT UnitObj;
FROM Bostlnf IMPORT BoundUnitRecType;
FROM RandMod IMPORT RandomObj;
FROM RecLL IMPORT LinkedListOfRecords;
TYPE

































TELL METHOD EnterNet(IN subscriberRadio : RadioObj;
IN subscriberUnit : UnitObj;






ASK METHOD UnitOnNet(IN Unit : UnitObj;
OUT OnTheNet : BOOLEAN;




ASK METHOD NextTraffic(OUT SelectedRadio : RadioObj);
ASK METHOD ConstructWaitingList
(OUT WaitingList : WaitingListType;
OUT NumberlnWaitingList : INTEGER;
IN HighestPrecedenceSought : PrecedenceType;
OUT HighestPrecedenceFound : PrecedenceType;
IN TestAvailable : BOOLEAN);
ASK METHOD SelectRadio(IN WaitingList : WaitingListType;
IN NumberlnWaitingList : INTEGER;
OUT RadioChosen : RadioObj);
ASK METHOD CollectlntendedReceivers
(IN BoundUnitRec : BoundUnitRecType;
INOUT IntendedReceiverList : LinkedListOfRecords);
TELL METHOD AcknowledgementDelay
(IN IntendedReceiver : IntendedReceiverRec);
TELL METHOD TransmissionDelay (IN IntendedReceiverList
:
LinkedListOfRecords;




NetMasterList : ARRAY INTEGER OF NetObj;
NumberOfNets : INTEGER;
FreqGen : RandomObj;









FROM Globals IMPORT UnitLocationRec,
NetDesignationType,
RadioType;
FROM GrpMod IMPORT RankedObj;
FROM Bostlnf IMPORT BostlnstanceTxObj;
FROM StatMod IMPORT SINTEGER,TSINTEGER;












Available : BOOLEAN; {strictly mechanical}








ASK METHOD GETNetNum(IN i : INTEGER);
ASK METHOD GETUnitLocRec(IN ULR : UnitLocationRec);
ASK METHOD RequestTransmission
(IN BostTransferPack : BostlnstanceTxObp;
ASK METHOD SubmitBost













ASK METHOD FixNetIndex(IN Netlndex : INTEGER);
END OBJECT;

























Alpha : REAL; {Alpha controls the slope of the failure rate of the
overall interstimulation times.}
MaxStimulationEpochs : INTEGER; {Maximum number of TrafGen loops.}
ASK METHOD Objlnit;
TELL METHOD GenerateTraffic;
ASK METHOD AddToRates(IN Rate : REAL);




























TELL METHOD DeletePenalty(IN Penalty : REAL;
IN Rate : REAL);
TELL METHOD AddPenaltyON Penalty : REAL;
IN Rate : REAL);









FROM Unit IMPORT UnitObj;



















TELL METHOD Jam (IN CurrentUnit : UnitObj);
END OBJECT;
VAR











PROCEDURE SelectTgt(IN Jammer : JammerObj);



















MEOReceiverRecArray = ARRAY INTEGER OF MEOReceiverRecType;
































ASK METHOD GETMEO(IN MEORec : MEORecType;
IN Number : INTEGER);
ASK METHOD ConnectToUnit(IN connectingUnit : UnitLocationRec;
IN rate : REAL );


































MEOReceiverRecArray = ARRAY INTEGER OF MEOReceiverRecType;
















































ASK METHOD GETMEO(IN MEORec : MEORecType;
IN Number : INTEGER);
ASK METHOD ConnectToUnit(IN connectingUnit : UnitLocationRec;
IN rate : REAL );



















FROM Globals IMPORT UnitLocationRec,
NetDesignationType,
logFile;
FROM Bostlnf IMPORT BostlnstanceRecType,
BostlnstanceTxObj,
BoundUnitRecType;
FROM Bost IMPORT MEORecType;
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FROM Radio IMPORT RadioObj;





PROCEDURE RouteON BostTxPack : BostlnstanceTxObj;
IN NewMEORec : MEORecType;
IN InstanceRec : BostlnstanceRecType;
IN SenderUnit : UnitObj;
OUT BoundUnitRec : BoundUnitRecType;
OUT RadioList : RadioListType;




APPENDIX B. EXAMPLE IMPLEMENTATION MODULE
One MCCAAM implementation module is provided for the curious
reader to see how an object's methods are coded. The Jammer Object has
several of the major methods in the simulation program and are detailed
below:
IMPLEMENTATION MODULE Jammer;
FROM IOMod IMPORT StreamObj,FileUseType(Input);
FROM MathMod IMPORT SQRT, POWER;
FROM Globals IMPORT UnitLocationRec, ALL RadioType,ScenarioStopTime;
FROM Radio IMPORT RadioObj;
FROM Net IMPORT RadioNetRecType,NetObj, NetMasterList;
FROM Unit IMPORT UnitObj,LocatioriList,UnitLocationListRecType;
FROM SimMod IMPORT Intermpt,SimTime;
FROM RandMod IMPORT RandomObj;









ASK JamFile TO Open("jammer.dat",Input);
ASK JamFile TO Readlnt(NumJammers);
NEW(JammerMasterList, l..NumJammers);
FOR i := 1 TO NumJammers
ASK JamFile TO ReadString(IOName);
ASK JamFile TO ReadInt(IONumber);
ASK JamFile TO ReadReal(IOXCoord);
ASK JamFile TO ReadReal (IOYCoord);









PROCEDURE CalcDist (IN A : JammerObj ; IN B : UnitObj) : REAL;
{ }
VAR
XDIST, YDIST : REAL;
BEGIN
XDIST := ABS(A.XCoord - (ASK B loc.XCoord));
YDIST := ABS(A.YCoord - (ASK B loc.YCoord));
RETURN (SQRT(POWER(XDIST,2.0) + POWER(YDIST,2.0))*100.0);
END PROCEDURE;
{ }












OUTPUTfHigh LocList is : \HIGH(LocationList));
WHILE (i <= NumberOfLocations)
IF LocationList[i] o NILOBJ
LocationListRec := ASK LocationList[i] First();
ELSE
OUTPUT("&&&&&&&&&&& i value for jammer prob is :", i);
END IF;
WHILE LocationListRec o NILREC
CurrentUnit := LocationListRec.Unit;
Dist := CalcDist(Jammer, CurrentUnit);
150
{Check to ensure distance is being calculated correctly}
IF FALSE
OUTPUTS" *************************" v
OUTPUTfDistance from ",ASK CurrentUnit name," to ");
OUTPUT(ASK Jammer Name, " is the following : ", Dist);
OUTPUT;
END IF;
IF Dist < (ASK Jammer Range)
IF TRUE
ASK TraceStream TO WriteString("About to jam a unit");
ASK TraceStream TO WriteLn;
END IF;
TELL Jammer TO Jam(CurrentUnit);
END IF;








































JamBandLow := ASK JFreqGen UniformReal(30.0,88.0);
FOR i := 1 TO (ASK CurrentUnit numRadios)
CASE (ASK CurrentUnit.radio[i] Equipment)
WHEN PRC77:
CurrentRadio := ASK CurrentUnit radiofi];
CurrentNet := NetMasterList[ASK CurrentRadio netlndex];
RadioFreq := ASK CurrentNet Frequency;
IF CurrentRadio.Available
OUTPUT("Jamming an available PRC77.. if in correct freq. range
&&&&&");
IF (RadioFreq > JamBandLow) AND (RadioFreq < JamBandLow +
JBandWidth)
ASK CurrentRadio TO BecomeJammed;
INC(NumJammed)
;
RadioNet := NetMasterList[ASK CurrentRadio netlndex];
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Interrupt(RadioNet, "ExecuteBusyPeriod");
OUTPUTfJust jammed a PRC-77 radio for following unit:");




TELL RadioNet TO ChangeFreq;
TELL CurrentRadio TO BecomeUnJammed IN duration;
ELSE
ASK TraceStream TO WriteString("Didn't jam radio.. .freq. not in
range");
ASK TraceStream TO WriteLn;
END IF;
ELSE




OUTPUTfAttempted to jam a SINCGARS Unit");
OTHERWISE
OUTPUT("Attempted to jam an HF radio");
END CASE;
END FOR;
IF (Active) AND (SimTime() < ScenarioStopTime + 100.0)




END {IMP} MODULE {Jammer}.
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APPENDIX C. TIME-LATE PENALTIES FOR BOSTS
The delay in performance of individual Basic Operational SubTasks
(BOSTs) from jamming or simply because of traffic may have differing effects
on performance of the Marine Corps missions depending upon the BOST.
Delay of a reporting task will not directly cause lives to be lost but delay to a
fire mission may. Therefore in aggregating total delay, the minutes of delay
should be given differing weights in calculating a communictions measure of
effectiveness based on timeliness. This appendix describes a set of relative
weights or penalties for each of the BOSTs. [Ref. 18]
Before describing the results however, it is noted that the BOSTs have
been partitioned into those that are relevant to VHF single-channel nets and
those that are not. This reduces the number of penalties to be determined.
The BOSTs not considered are primarily the aviation and amphibious
landing BOSTs that are performed with radios of other frequencies or higher
capacities and are not candidates for SINCGARs. In addition, the Combat
Service Support (CSS) BOSTs are not considered in the baseline analysis.
The initial set of penalties for the SINCGARS relevant BOSTs are given
in the accompanying table, Appendix E. They were estimated by relative
judgments of the research team with a base penalty of 100 for the standard fire
mission BOST under the call for force MBOT. Only a few BOSTs score higher
than this. In general, those BOSTs that involve execution of immediate fires
have about 100 points and all others have lower penalties. Coordination of
fire BOSTs have the next highest penalties, followed by planning and finally
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reporting which have values of 5 to 10 points. This leaves room for combat
service support BOSTs to be added at a later date if desired.
The point scheme was designed to give an order of magnitude difference
in ratio values between the most time critical and least time critical combat
operations. We believe the order of penalties would not significantly vary
between individual raters although the penalty ratio might vary.
The penalties in this appendix are for each minute of delay or time late.
This could be measured from either initiation of the BOST or from some
threshold time after initiation based on precedence (i.e. 10 minutes for
FLASH messages) or other standard operating procedure or CEOI thresholds.
It would also be possible to extend the penalty structure to include a one-time
penalty for any delay above a threshold. This could provide additional
discrimination between alternative allocations but would be dependent upon
setting an acceptable threshold, which may be difficult to establish. If
required, the one-time penalties could be established as a multiple of the
penalties estimated above. The size of the multiple could be the same for
each BOST somewhere in the range of a multiple of 10 to 100 or could vary by
BOST category.
An additional hierarchical dimension to the penalties could be added to
reflect relative importance of the BOSTs as a function of whether they were
initiated by the platoon, company, battalion or brigade. With respect to fire
mission it is unlikely that there is any difference in the importance of the
message according to the command hierarchy. However for planning
messages or orders it can be argued that delay moving down the chain of
command implies that many more units will be affected then by delay at the
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bottom of the chain. Therefore it may be desirable to introduce a factor to
change some of the penalties based on command level. At this time the
initiators of each BOST are not yet specified so this refinement must wait
until data on frequencies of initiation of BOSTs by command level are
known. It is likely that a BOST will ordinarily only be initiated by one level
of command. The initial set of penalties are shown below as penalties per
minute of delay from initiation of the BOST. For descriptions of the listed
BOSTs (and all others), see [20].
# Name Preced. Allotted Penalty P.Rate Perish? P.Point
1 StdFireMission 3 63 100 3 True 120
2 DistGCEOrders 3 36 10 2 True 80
3 FinalProtFires 4 32 150 15 True 120
4 Intel.Report 3 24 60 0.5 True 120
5 CheckFire 3 15 125 10 True 30
6 HighAngleFire 2 64 100 5 True 130
7 HighBurstReg 2 40 40 True 80
8 PrecisionReg. 2 72 40 2 True 145
9 MortarMission 3 52 25 2 True 104
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APPENDIX D. SIMULATION SCENARIO
Our friendly situation is intended to be as general as possible and still
obtain realism. We have taken the notional amphibious MEB depicted in the
Marine Air-ground Task Force Presentation Team Pocket Guide of 1 October
1990 to be our base MAGTF for this analysis. Based on guidance from the
Warfighting Center, we have assumed that the amphibious operation is over
and the MEB is in conflict ashore.
In order to provide some general framework in which to organize our
notional MEB on the ground and provide some realistic distance calculations
for radio and jammer ranges, we have chosen the 1:50,000 edition 3-DMA of
Twenty-Nine Palms West. This training area in southern California is one of
the few areas in the Marine Corps that see large units rotate through for live
fire and force-on-force exercises on a continual basis. By using this terrain for
our analysis example, we provide the Marine Corps analysts with a common
reference point. Additionally, the potential exists to obtain actual exercise
data from this training area for model comparison.
We have task organized the Ground Combat Element (GCE) into a
reinforced infantry regiment consisting of a mechanized infantry battalion, a
normal infantry battalion, a heliborne infantry battalion, a direct support
artillery battalion, a recon company and a light armored infantry company.
The self propelled artillery battery has been attached to the mechanized
battalion and the remainder of the artillery is in general support. We have
not included "Bravo" or alternate command groups because displacement
(units moving) is not currently included in the model and because adding
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displacement will not greatly help our ability to distinguish between C3
architectures.
The Direct Air Support Center (DASC) is co-located with the regimental
command group, and the remainder of the Aviation Combat Element (ACE)
is located at an airstrip several miles from the GCE.
The Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) is located near the MEB
headquarters. Combat Service Support Detachments are not considered close
enough to the maneuver units to provide alternate routing for GCE message
traffic.
This task organization, including unit locations is depicted here in
Appendix D. To specify a high but realistic level of activity for the individual
units, we have adopted the following general scenario.
The heliborne battalion has seized its objective and is engaged in heavy
combat. The battalion reserve has been committed, so all three companies are
engaged. The mechanized battalion was moving up Gays Pass to link up with
the heliborne battalion when it encountered stiff resistance. It is also heavily
engaged and has committed its reserve. The tank company and all three rifle
companies are engaged. The infantry battalion, which was following in trace
of the mechanized battalion as the regimental reserve, has reinforced the
mechanized battalion with two rifle companies. The third rifle company is
now the regimental reserve. Thus, we have a tank company and eight rifle
companies engaged in combat along with the additional units illustrated on
the following page.
The purpose of detailing a general scenario like the above is to motivate a
high intensity traffic environment and provide the analyst a frame of
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reference for making parameter changes with respect to units, jammers, and



































































































Figure 23. Example Task Organization
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1:50,000 MCAGCC, 29 Palms West Edition 3-DMA
1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade
Unit Location
1MEBCOC (CE) 793 068
MAG24 (ACE) 776 946


















lstBn3dMar (COC,FSCC,HST,) (Helo Bn) 465 225
lstPltCoA3dEngrBn 475 232
ACol/3 (CP,FAC, 81FO) 472 236
l/3STADetl
BCol /3 (CP,FAC, 81FO) 478 230
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APPENDIX E. ANALYSIS JAMMER DATA
The table below lists the specific values for the two jammer objects that
were modeled in the analysis example. These values are located in the
"jammer.dat" file and can easily be changed using DB, the data base
manipulation portion of MCCAAM. Any number of jammers can be
modelled to produce a full range of interference for an architecture of interest.
Only two jammers were modelled for our analysis example since we
examined such a small portion of a MEB architecture.
VALUE DESCRIPTION






30.0 Jam Band Width Mhz
60.0 Sector Width (degrees)
15.0 Jamming Duration (mins)






40.0 Jam Band Width Mhz
60.0 Sector Width (degrees)
10.0 Jamming Duration (mins)
45.0 TimeBetween Target Selection (mins)
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APPENDIX F. ANALYSIS RUN DATA
The table below lists the specific values for the global variables that were
used in the analysis example. These values are located in the "c3run.dat" file
and can easily be changed using DB, the data base manipulation portion of
MCCAAM.
10000.00 Simulation Horizon
true = send OBE Traffic
T = (T/F) Do/Do Not model radio failures
T = (T/F) Do/Do Not model jamming
1 = # replications
2 = # of allowed retries (in queue)
0.0000 = MEO duration variability in (0,1)
1.0000 = Mean Acknowledgement Time
0.0000 = Acknowledgement variability in (0,1)
1440.00 = time (mins) between freq changes
8.00 = time (mins) to make freq changes
2 = max retrials by a net
2.00 = entry time for SINCGARS
1.00 = entry time for PRC-77
1.00 = entry time for PRC-77 on SINCGARS net
15.00 = repair/replace time (mins) for PRC-77
25.00 = repair/replace time (mins) for SINCGARS
60.00 = jammer sector width in degrees
5.00 = MIJI delay time
5.00 = the time before retrying an impossible MEO
F = the graphic presentation of the penalty process
4000.00 = PRC mean time between failures (mins)
16000.00 = SINCGARS mean time between failures (mins)
4000.00 = HF mean time between failures (mins)
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APPENDIX G. RADIO ALLOCATIONS
The following table shows how the different types of radios were

















1/3 TAC 1 1
2/3 TAC 1 1
3/3 TAC 1 1
A 1/12 COF 1 1
B 1/12 COF ' 1 1
C 1/12 COF 1 1





APPENDIX H. EXAMPLE TRACE FILE
The following pages give an example of the MCCAAM "c31og.out" file
which was essential to all debugging efforts. By carefully placing output
statements throughout the various implementation modules, we are able to
track individual messages as they route through different nets.
Simulation Horizon = 1000.000 time units
simulation begins
About to jam a unit
About to jam a unit
About to jam a unit
NEW BOST STARTING
getunit: location and membernum of input 1 1
asking timer to experience life
*********** Just Generated StandardFireMission
* the time is now 0.000000
InterStimTime is: 41.7434
Didn't jam radio.. .freq. not in range
Didn't jam radio...freq. not in range
BtryFO Receive bosfc this unit's loc. = 1
intended receiver number is: 1
MEONum =
bost instance descriptor = StandardFireMission
getunit: location and membernum of input 1 1
getunit location and membernum of input 1 1
we are the destination
hi from route, after operating on sender
\\\\\\\Point-to-Point Comm///////
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finding potential receivers for MEO Receiver 1
receiver is a new player for this bost
net= 1
Unit attempting send is BtryFO
unit type AND RECEIVER NUMBER 3
finding potential receivers for MEO Receiver 2
receiver is a new player for this bost
net= 1
Unit attempting send is BtryFO
unit type AND RECEIVER NUMBER 4
Talking for receiver 1 on radio
BtryFO Receive bost: this unit's loc. = 1
intended receiver number is: 1
MEONum =
bost instance descriptor = StandardFireMission
Ghost radio in receive bost
RadioList[I] and I 1
cutting out of receive bost
===========Enter Net==========*====
this net is DsArtyBnFd number 2
entering unit BtryFDC
this net now has 1 subscribers.
===========EnterNet===============
this net is BdeFSC number 4
entering unit BdeFSCC
this net now has 2 subscribers,
unit is on the net at time 2.000000
===========Enter Net=========
this net is InfRegtTac number
entering unit RegtCoc
this net now has 2 subscribers,
unit is on the net at time 2.000000
===========Enter Net=========
this net is InfRegtCmd number
entering unit BdeCOC
this net now has 2 subscribers,
unit is on the net at time 2.000000
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beginning wait for perishable, wait is 5.0000
THE TIME IS NOW 15.000
NEW BOST STARTING
getunit: location and membernum of input 1
asking timer to experience life
*********** Just Generated StandardFireMission
* the time is now 41.743357
InterStimTime is: 37.9275
BtryFO Receive bost: this unit's loc. = 1
intended receiver number is: 1
MEONum =
bost instance descriptor = StandardFireMission
getunit location and membernum of input 1 1
getunit: location and membernum of input 1 1
we are the destination
hi from route, after operating on sender
\\\\\\\Point-to-Point Comm///////
finding potential receivers for MEO Receiver 1







Unique receiver determined, receiver is BnFDC
in route
the RADIOLIST[I] = 1
the net used to transmit = 1
finding potential receivers for MEO Receiver 2








Unique receiver determined, receiver is BnFSCC
in route
the RADIOLIST[I] = 1
the net used to transmit = 1
Talking for receiver 1 on radio 1
Talking for receiver 2 on radio 1
requesting that the bost work through radio 1
In the radio's request trans trying to reach net # 1
net is idle, so we tell it to xbp
in Execute busy period
net index = 1
MEONumToGo = 1
MEORec.MessageNumber = 1
getunit: location and membernum of input 3 1
getunit: location and membernum of input 4 1
th trial out of 2 beginning
IntendRec.IntendedReceiverNumber is 1
IntendRec.RadioNetRec.Unit name is BnFDC
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT DELAY
this receiver is BnFDC
netlndex for the SelectedRadio is 1
condition successful contact
IntendRec.IntendedReceiverNumber is 2
IntendRec.RadioNetRec.Unit name is BnFSCC
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT DELAY
this receiver is BnFSCC
netlndex for the SelectedRadio is 1
condition successful contact
TRANSMISSION DELAY
this receiver is BnFDC condition for receiver 1 is SUCCESSFUL CONTACT
this receiver is BnFSCC condition for receiver 2 is SUCCESSFUL CONTACT
BnFDC Receive bost: this unit's loc. = 3
intended receiver number is: 1
MEONum = 1
bost instance descriptor = StandardFireMission
getunit: location and membernum of input 3 1
getunit: location and membernum of input 3 1
we are the destination
meo not done yet
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APPENDIX I. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AHP Analytical Hierarchy Process
BOST Broad Operational Sub Task
C2FAC Command and Control Facility
C4I2 Command,Control,Communications,Computers, Intelligence
CDB Communications Data Base
CSS Combat Service Support
DCT Digital Communications Terminal
DF Direction Finding
DMA Defense Mapping Agency
ECAC Electronic Compatibility Analysis Center
ECCM Electronic Counter-Counter Measures
ECM Electronic Counter Measures
ERF Electronic Remote Fill
EW Electronic Warfare
FDC Fire Direction Center
FM Frequency Modulated
FO Forward Observer
FSCC Fire Support Coordination Center
HF High Frequency
MACCS Marine Air Command & Control System
MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force
MAMES Multiple Agency Message Exchange Occurrences
MCCES Marine Corps Communications Electronics School
MCES Modular Command & Control Evaluation Structure
MCTCA Marine Corps Tactical Communications Architecture
MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEF Marine Expeditionary Force
MEO Message Exchange Occurrence
MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit
MIRC MAGTF Interoperability Requirements Concepts
MOE Measure of Effectiveness
MOP Measure of Performance
MOT Maturity Operational Test
MTACCS Marine Tactical Command and Control System
O/A Operational Assessment
OPFAC Operational Facility
PLRS Position, Location, Reporting System
RT ReceiverAransmitter
SCR Single Channel Radio
SINCGARS Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
SNR Signal to Noise Ratio
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
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TTDP Technical Interface Design Plan
TM Threat Model




1. Coates, R. A., "Automated Support for C2," Marine Corps Gazette, p. 36,
December 1990.
2. O'Neil, W. D., Seminar on U.S. Oceans Policy, Technology and Naval
Force Structure, UVA, January 1980.
3. Statement of Work between the Naval Postgraduate School and U. S.
Marine Corps Warfighting Center, Quantico, VA, November 1990.
4. Sovereign, M., JDL Symposium Abstract, June 1991.
5. Metersky, M., Sovereign, M., Sweet, R., Command and Control
Evaluation Workshop, MORS C2 MOE Workshop, Naval Postgraduate
School, January 1985, pp. 6-1 to 6-4.
6. OH 6-1 A, Ground Combat Element Command and Control, Marine Corps
Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA, June 1988.
7. Marine Corps Combat Development Command, FMFM 3-30,
Communications, Quantico, VA.
8. SWL Inc., Interim Report No. 1, C3I Studies and Analysis, Marine Corps
Communications/Computer Architecture—1995, October 1989.
9. Haislip, W. A., Communications and Electronic Warfare Modules for the
Simulation of Tactical Alternative Responses (STAR), Masters Thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 1979.
10. Bryant, B. J., A Model to Forecast Performance of U.S. Army Tactical VHF-
FM Communications, Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA, March 1986.
11. Bailey, M.P., Kemple, W., Sovereign, M., West, M.B., Chase, C, Object-
Oriented Modeling of the Communications Networks of the MAGTF,
1991 Summer Simulation Conference Abstract, February, 1991.
12. Ucles, J.L., Siliato, J.M., "Hierarchical Models Give New Simulation
Accuracy," SIGNAL magazine, July 1990.
172
13. Hillier, F.S., Lieberman, G.J., Introduction to Operations Research, Fifth
Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1990.
14. Department of Defense, Catalog of Wargaming & Military Simulation
Models, 11th Edition, (J-8) Force Structure, Resource and Assessment
Directorate, September 1989.
15. CACI Products Co., Modsim II Tutorial, Revision 8, January, 1990.
16. Draft Initial Statement of Requirement for the Portable Data Link System,
Marine Corps Combat Development Center, 1990.
17. MPTCD Working Papers, Marine Corps Combat Development Center,
Part I, pg. 14, 1990.
18. Sovereign, M, Task 1A MCES, Naval Postgraduate School, July, 1991.
19. ]CS, Pub 1.
20. Technical Interface Design Plan for Marine Tactical Systems (MTS TIDP),
Marine Corps Combat Development Center, October, 1987.
21. Marine Corps Tactical Communications Architecture (MCTCA), Marine
Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA, June 1989.
22. Lomow, G., Baezner, D., A Tutorial Introduction to Object-Oriented
Simulation, Jade Simulations International Corporation, 1991 Summer
Computer Simulation Conference Proceedings, pp.1165-1166, 1991.
23. Chase, C, Determining Model Enhancement Benefits, Master's Thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 1991.
24. Department of Defense DOD 3235.1-H, Test and Evaluation of System
Reliability Availability and Maintainability, March 1982
25. Bailey, M.P., Kemple, W., Sovereign, M., West, M., and Chase, C, Object-
Oriented Modeling of the Communications Networks of the MAGTF,
Marine Corps Study Summary, July 1991.
26. Lindsay, G., "Class Notes OA 4304 Decision Theory," May 1991.
27. Department of the Army, FM 24-18 Tactical Single-Channel Radio
Communications Techniques,, December, 1984, pp. 6-1,6-9.
173
28. Kemple, W.G., MCCAAM Study Status Report, to MAGTF Warfighting
Center, Quantico, VA, May, 1991.
29. Kemple, W.G., Task 2 Study Report, to MAGTF Warfighting Center,
Quantico, VA, March, 1991.
30. Box, G.E.P., Hunter, W.G., and Hunter, J.S., Statistics for Experimenters,
John Wiley & Sons, 1991.
31. Network Assessment Model (NAM), Executive Summary, Ft. Gordon,
GA, pp.199-200.
32. Kemple, W.G., West, M.B., and Chase, C, MCCAAM User's Manual.
33. Headquarters United States Army Combat Developments Command,
Force Developments: The Measurement of Effectiveness, Fort Belvoir,
VA, USACDC Pamphlet No. 71-l,pp. 4-126 to 4-137, January 1973.
34. Law, A.M., Kelton, W.D., Simulation Modeling and Analysis, McGraw-
Hill Publishing Co., 1982.
35. U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Agency Report: OTEA/IER-
OT-280, Independent Evaluation of the Single Channel Ground and
Airborne Radio Subsystem, Very High Frequency (SINCGARS-V)
Maturity Operational Test (U), Falls Church, VA, March 1984.
36. Headquarters, Department of the Army, VHF-FM Portion of the
SINCGARS-V Subsystem-Concept Formulation Package, Appendix IV,
Cost & Operational Effectiveness Analysis, Washington, D.C., October
1975.
37. Goodman, G.W., "Army's SINCGARS Back on Track; Radios in Korea Get
High Marks", Armed Forces Journal International, August, 1988.
38. Saaty, T.L., "How to Make a Decision: The Analytic Hierarchy Process,"
European Journal of Operational Research 48, September 1990.
39. Forman, E., and Saaty, T.L., Expert Choice Software Package for IBM PC,
Expert Choice, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, 1983-1990.
174
BIBLIOGRAPHY
App, K.G., Evaluation of SINCGARS Capability and Interoperability with
Respect to the Navy and Marine Corps, Study Project, U.S. Army War
College, PA, DTIC 88527019, March 1988.
BDM Corporation, SUPPRESSOR Simulation System: User's Guide, Volume 1,
Albuquerque, NM.
Bouthonnier, V., System Effectiveness Analysis for Command & Control,
Masters Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September 1982.
Carp, G., Hennings M.M., C3I Systems Research & Evaluation Library,
Volume II: Document Data, MITRE C3I Division, November 1982.
Clapp, L.G.A., Whaley, W.M., Worger, W., Marine Corps Mobile Command
Concept—Executive Summary, Study, Naval Ocean Systems Center, DTIC 4D-
B-071424, November, 1982.
"
Cravis, Howard, Communications Network Analysis, Arthur D. Little, Inc., C.
1981.
Cronin, R., A Packet Radio Logistic Network for a Marine Amphibious
Landing Force, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA,
March 1987.
Ephremides, A., Wieselthier, J.E., Baker, D.J., A Design Concept for Reliable
Mobile Radio Networks with Frequency-Hopping Signaling, Naval Research
Laboratory Report 9137, DTIC 88122022, September 1988.
Griggs, L.W., Adams, R.A., Zyda, M.J., An Interactive Computer Graphics
Network Monitor for a Tactical Communications Network, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, August 1987.
Headquarters United States Army Combat Developments Command, Force
Developments: The Measurement of Effectiveness, Fort Belvoir, VA,
USACDC Pamphlet No. 71-l,pp. 4-126 to 4-137, January 1973.
Kleinrock, Leonard, Queuing Systems, Vols. I & II, John Wiley & Sons Inc.,
page 299, Copyright 1976.
175
Levis, A.H., Survivable Command Center Evaluation Tools, Study, Sweet
Associates, LTD, February 1989.
Lewis, P.A., Orav, E.J., Simulation Methodology for Statisticians, Operations
Analysts and Engineers, April 1985
Madhow, U., "Bounds and Asymptotic Results for the Performance of
Asynchronous Frequency-Hop Packet Radio Networks," Study, University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, DTIC AS-A182 865, June 1987.
MAGTF Interoperability Requirements Concepts (MIRC), C3 Proponency
Branch, Quantico, VA, 1990.
Manpower, Personnel and Training Concept Document (MPTCD) for the
ICOM SINCGARS, 1990.
Martin, P.J.F., Large Scale C3 Systems: Experiment Design and System
Improvement, Masters Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, LIDS-
TH-1580, August 1986.
Nair, R.R., Grimm, M.A., Althouse, E.L., Discrete-Event Communication
Network Simulator for the Naval Research Laboratory Test Bed Simulation
System, NRL Memorandum Report 6360, November 1988.
Naval Ocean Systems Center, Top Level Planning for the Marine Air/Ground
Distributed Architecture (MAGDA) System, DTIC AD-B-075881, July 1983.
Naval Ocean Systems Center, Marine Corps Mobile Command Concept
(MCC): Functional Interface Analysis, DTIC AD-B-052876, July 1980.
Noel, A.L., Performance Study of a Marine Expeditionary Force Radio System,
Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 1990.
Olson, Philip A. Jr., Parametric Simulation of Tactical Single Channel
Frequency Modulated Communications, Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, CA, September 1980.
Sweet, R., "The MCES and the Search for Generic Measures," Command &
Control Research Symposium, Joint Directors of Laboratories, National
Defense University, Washington, DC, 1987.
Systems Exploration, Inc., User's Manual for the U.S. Marine Corps Landing
Force Integrated Communications System (LFICS) Simulation, Contract
N00123-80-D-0228, prepared for Naval Ocean Systems Center, September 1982.
176
"Tactical C4I," SIGNAL Magazine, May 1990.
Woehler, K.E., A Non-Equilibrium Thermodynamic Model of a Cybernetic
Continuum with Local Equilibrium for Military C3I, Study, Department of




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 52 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5100
3. Operations Research Department, (Code OR/BA) 2
Attn: Professor M. P. Bailey
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
4. Operations Research Department, (Code OR/KE) 2
Attn: Professor W. Kemple
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
5. Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code TE06) 2
Headquarters United States Marine Corps
Washington, D. C. 20380-0001
6. Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code MA) 2
Attn: Captain M. B. West
Headquarters United States Marine Corps
Washington, D. C. 20380-0001
7. C3 Proponency Branch (WF11) 2
Attn: Captain Casey Reece
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, VA 22134-5001
8. MAGTF Warfighting Center (WF13) 2
Attn: Lieutenant Colonel Cibuzar




Attn: Captain Al Noel











ling and analysis of a
Marine Corps communica-
tions architecture.
9-93

